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INTRODUCTION
The continuing social and political aftermath of the September 11,
2001 attacks; the legislative responses of Congress to the attacks, such
as the controversial USA Patriot Act;2 the announcement of an
undeclared "War on Terror"; fears of possible Al-Qaeda "sleepers"
living among us; and the slow progress in pacifying Iraq consistently
dominate the U.S. print and broadcast news media.3
Accordingly, U.S. government officials, employers and their
employees, interest groups, and individual citizens are keenly focused
on how such events and actions may impact Americans and the
American way of life. Expanded administrative agency authority and
responsibility for implementing the emerging programs and policies
are central to the frenzied efforts of Congress and the White House to
respond to an extensive array of terrorist threats.
Understandably, questions are being raised about the legality-
constitutionality of several of the government's terrorist threat
countermeasures.4 Such questions immediately imply judicial review
of those measures in order to assess their legality-constitutionality.
Thus, the emerging questions are: Is judicial review available? What
is the scope of judicial review that a federal court will employ to
evaluate an agency's interpretations of its legal authority? And, are
the courts reliable guardians of individual rights in times of crisis? On
2. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 203, 115 Stat. 272, 278-81 (2001).
3. A July 11, 2004, LexisNexis news search in the "U.S. Newspapers and Wire
Services" database for the week of July 4-10, 2004 yielded 2931 results.
4. See, e.g., Federal Judge Rules Part of Patriot Act Unconstitutional, Am. Const.
Soc'y Bull., Jan. 30, 2004, available at http://www.acslaw.org/bulletins/01-30-04.htm.
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the assumption that judicial review generally will be available, this
Article addresses the scope of judicial review question.'
Comprehensive analysis of scope of judicial review principles
regarding an agency's constructions of its authorizing legislation
should not begin with the 1984 Chevron case,6 although Chevron's
notoriety might suggest otherwise.7
Many lower courts and commentators perceived Chevron to be a
watershed decision that established a new model of judicial analysis
for review of an agency's constructions of its own legislation. Yet, a
unanimous U.S. Supreme Court stated early in its Chevron opinion
5. Professor David Cole states that "the conventional wisdom is that courts
function poorly as guardians of liberty in times of crisis," citing as examples U.S.
Supreme Court cases from World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. David
Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of
Crisis, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2565, 2565 (2003). However, Cole does not agree with that
view. He says the following:
But the conventional wisdom is too pessimistic. It is akin to arguing that
Marbury demonstrates the weakness of the judiciary because the Court
failed to afford Marbury himself relief for the violation of his rights.
Considered over time, judicial review of emergency and national security
measures can and has established important constraints on the exercise of
emergency powers and has restricted the scope of what is acceptable in
future emergencies.
Id. at 2566. Although the judges were under "tremendous pressure[,] .... a surprising
number of judicial decisions initially upheld claims of constitutional rights against
official antiterrorist measures . . [G]iven the history of judicial deference in times
of crisis, the early decisions were quite stunning." Id. at 2578. Professors Owen Gross
and Mark Tushnet, on the other hand, propose affirmative recognition of extra-
constitutional emergency powers. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules. Should Responses
to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 Yale L.J. 1011 (2003); Mark Tushnet,
Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 Wis. L. Rev.
273. On this view, the courts would not play a role in restraining such authority.
Cole, however, finds that "[t]hese proposals are misguided." Cole, supra, at 2587.
Cole would hesitate to adopt the Gross-Tushnet position for several reasons:
First, it is predicated on a distinction between "emergency" periods and
"normal" periods that... simply cannot be maintained ....
Second, the Gross-Tushnet proposal.., would be likely to undermine the
protection of rights during emergencies (and by extension, during normal
times that officials call emergencies). ...
Third, there is little reason to trust the political process to do the job of
judging that Gross and Tushnet would assign to it....
Finally, Gross and Tushnet's proposal rests on the conventional wisdom that
courts cannot be trusted to perform well in times of crisis.
Id. at 2587-91.
6. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
7. See, e.g., David J. Galalis, Environmental Justice and Title VI in the Wake of
Alexander v. Sandoval: Disparate-Impact Regulations Still Valid Under Chevron, 31
B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 61, 78 n.138 (2004) ("The test that Chevron elucidated was
not new, but firmly rooted in long established precedent." (relying on United States v.
Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961))).
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that the decision was based on "well-settled" principles8 of judicial
review.'
Therefore, in Section II of its opinion, the Court discussed and cited
as authority many of its earlier cases to articulate the proper role of
courts when performing this reviewing function." More than two
dozen of its cases, dating from 1827 through 1982, were said to
support the following principles:
Courts are the final authority on issues of statutory construction
where the "intent of Congress is clear ... on the precise question at
issue." 11
"If the statute is silent or ambiguous" on the "specific issue" the
court decides whether the agency's construction is "permissible.' 12
To be "permissibl[e]" the agency construction need not be the only
one it could have adopted, nor conformable to "the reading the
court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a
judicial proceeding. 13
Agency power to administer a legislative program "necessarily
requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any
gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress."14
Delegation of authority to the agency to fill any explicit or implicit
gap may be express or implied. 15
Courts should give "considerable weight" to agency constructions
pursuant to the long recognized principle of deference to them. 16
Where statutory constructions involve reconciling conflicting
policies and more than ordinary knowledge is necessary for "a full
understanding.., of the statutory policy," an agency "choice...
[that] represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies
that were committed to the agency's care by the statute" should not
be disturbed "unless ... the accommodation is not one that
Congress would have sanctioned. 17
8. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.
9. Id. ("In light of these well-settled principles it is clear the Court of Appeals
misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing the regulations at issue.").
10. Id. at 842.
11. Id. at 842-43.
12. Id. at 843.
13. Id. at 843 n.11.
14. Id. at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
15. Id. at 843-44.
16. Id. at 844.
17. Id. at 844-45 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961)).
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The earlier cases referenced by the Court include Batterton v.
Francis,8 Morton v. Ruiz, 9 United States v. Shimer,2" SEC v.
Chenery,2 l and NLRB v. Hearst.22
This Article represents an attempt to identify in U.S. Supreme
Court cases basic and recurring themes of principles of the scope of
judicial review of agency legal determinations, and to synthesize them.
Accordingly, the Article contains my analysis of the original opinions,
which are summarized throughout. Appropriate references to
relevant scholarship are included, of course, but the Article is not
based primarily on an attempt to discern the basic themes from the
scholarship, nor base the synthesis on it. The goal is to produce a
synthesis based on findings from case law. Thus, a fresh look at the
major Court decisions from 1941 to 2004 is necessary to my purpose.
Therefore, the analysis in this Article will begin with pre-Chevron
cases, many of which the Court incorporated into its Chevron analysis
and holding. Of course, Chevron and post-Chevron cases will also be
analyzed through 2004.
In 1950, Professor Nathaniel L. Nathanson of Northwestern
University School of Law synthesized Supreme Court precedents and
articulated a "principle of limited judicial review" 3 of agency
determinations of questions of law and mixed questions of law and
fact. Nathanson expressly distinguished this principle from the
familiar Skidmore24 doctrine that an agency interpretation of a statute
it administers is entitled to the respectful consideration of the
reviewing court.25
The principle was applicable to both formal agency adjudication
and to agency legislative rulemaking. Also, it was said to apply
without "an essential difference in the two types of delegation, either
from the standpoint of delegation of discretionary authority or the
standard of judicial review. '"6
To "avoid both usurpation of administrative authority and
abnegation of judicial responsibility,"27 Professor Nathanson assigned
to the reviewing court primary responsibility to decide independently
"broader issue[s] of statutory interpretation,"28 and "basic,"29
18. 432 U.S. 416,424-26 (1977).
19. 415 U.S. at 231.
20. 367 U.S. at 382,383.
21. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
22. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
23. Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of
Statutes, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 470 (1950).
24. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
25. Nathanson, supra note 23, at 470.
26. Id. at 483.
27. Id. at 490.
28. Id. at 473.
29. Id. at 474.
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"fundamental, 30 or "general"'" questions concerning the underlying
goals and purposes of the statute.
To avoid judicial usurpation of delegated administrative authority,
he assigned to the agency primary authority for making interstitial
interpretations, applying statutory terms, applying statutory standards
to the facts, and making specific applications of broad statutory terms.
The reviewing court was to defer to the agency if these types of
statutory interpretation were reasonable or had a rational basis.
From the Nathanson concept there emerges the foundation of an
allocation model of scope of judicial review with independent
judgment of the judiciary limited to questions of the ultimate meaning
of the statute. That independent, but limited, role is to satisfy the
Marbury32 obligation to "say what the law is."33 By assigning primary
authority to the agency for day-to-day application of statutory terms
to facts, establishing interstitial statutory standards, and such matters
of administrative routine, the Nathanson model satisfies the
separation of powers obligation of the courts to avoid usurpation of
delegated administrative authority. Even so, the courts are enabled to
monitor agency actions and may provide legitimate review of agency
actions through application of the reasonableness or rational basis
standard.
In short, pursuant to this model, what I have chosen to label
"micromeaning" legislative interpretation questions are left to the
agency, if based on delegated legislative or judicial authority, and if
reasonable or rational. On the other hand, "macromeaning"
legislative interpretation questions are reviewed independently by the
court in compliance with the Marbury duty to "say what the law is."
Further, the agency's "micromeaning" interpretation must be
reasonable or rational in light of the "macromeaning" of the statute.
The Nathanson foundation for an allocation model of scope of
judicial review, amplified and modified to some extent by my
terminology and analysis is, in my judgment, a reasonable, sound
model for scope of judicial review of agency legal decisions. I also
30. Id. at 474, 476.
31. Id. at 476.
32. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
33. Id. at 177 ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is."). Professor Robert A. Anthony described a similar pattern of
allocation of primary responsibility in his review of the Court's pre-Chevron
deference to administrative agency legal determinations. Robert A. Anthony, Which
Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 8-12
(1990). Professor Clark Byse, quoting Judge Harold Leventhal, pointed out that
Congress was willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly to administrative
agencies because there is court review to assure that the agency exercises the
delegated power within statutory limits. "If our independent judiciary is to perform
this role of keeping the agency within its statutory limits, surely the court-not the
agency-must decide what the statute means." Clark Byse, Scope of Judicial Review
in Informal Rulemaking, 33 Admin. L. Rev. 183, 191 (1981).
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believe the Supreme Court cases demonstrate the allocation model
has, in fact, been applied by the Court quite consistently for many
years, and I will attempt to justify that perception.34 Coupling my
analysis of the Court's pre-Chevron cases with the fact that the Court
itself stated that Chevron was based on well-settled principles of scope
of judicial review, I have hesitated to accept Chevron as a watershed
case that established a new mode of judicial review. It is noteworthy
that at least thirty-seven law review and journal articles have cited the
Nathanson piece.35 However, only two pointed out how "strikingly
similar," as a general theory of statutory interpretation, the
Nathanson model is to the language of Chevron, thirty-four years
later.36
I. PRE-CHEVRON SCOPE OF REVIEW
I begin by revisiting some of the older Supreme Court cases to
examine their premises and evaluate conventional perceptions about
them. Applying the micromeaning-macromeaning allocation model, I
attempt to demonstrate that consistent scope of review themes run
through them. Most of the earlier cases through 1950 are, of course,
discussed in the Nathanson article.37
A. Agency Determinations Based on Delegated Judicial and
Legislative Authority
Gray v. Powell" and NLRB v. Hearst39 are fundamental to the
micromeaning-macromeaning allocation model of primacy on legal
34. But see Jonathon Bloomberg, Note, The Chevron Legacy: Young v.
Community Nutrition Institute Compounds the Confusion, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 113,
115 n.13, 116 (1987). Prior to Chevron, court review of agency determinations of law
fell into one of two fundamental irreconcilable lines of cases: a conventional de novo
review approach or a more deferential approach. Id. at 115 n.13. Even so, "a
framework exists which reconciles" the two lines. Id. at 116. "The common thread...
is the judicial search for congressionally imposed bounds." Id. Courts "examin[e] the
agency's enabling act ... [to] decide what authority Congress delegated to the agency
to determine whether the agency exceeded [that authority]." Id. at 117.
35. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative
Law, 74 Geo. L.J. 1, 63 n.74 (1985).
36. William S. Jordan, III, Deference Revisited: Politics as a Determinant of
Deference Doctrine and the End of the Apparent Chevron Consensus, 68 Neb. L. Rev.
454, 469-70 n.96 (1989); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two
Reconsidered, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1253, 1267-68 n.62 (1997). Professor Levin also
identified other commentators' models of judicial review of a similar orientation. Id.
(citing Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: An
Analysis of Chevron's Step Two, 2 Admin. L.J. 255, 262-65 (1988); Henry P.
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1983)).
37. See Nathanson, supra note 23. A notable exception is Packard Motor Car Co.
v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947). Why Professor Nathanson chose to exclude it is
puzzling.
38. 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
39. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
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questions arising out of formal agency adjudication. In both cases the
Court decided independently a question of the underlying purposes
and goals (macromeaning) of the agency-administered legislation. In
both cases the Court deferred to the judgment of the agency in
applying a statutory term to undisputed facts (micromeaning).
1. Gray v. Powell
Gray involved judicial review of an administrative order denying an
exception to a railroad which claimed to be a "producer" of the coal it
consumed under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937.4" The Commission
created to administer the Act was specifically authorized to grant or
deny, after opportunity for a hearing, an exemption from the Act's
price regulation plan for "coal consumed by the producer or coal
transported by the producer to himself for consumption by him."41
The railroad company had entered into an arrangement whereby it
leased certain mines from their owners. A contractor selected by the
railroad simultaneously leased mining equipment on the premises
from the owner.42 The railroad and the contractor also simultaneously
entered into a contract for the mining of the coal by the contractor
and its delivery to the railroad.43 The contractor was termed an
independent contractor in the document.
The micromeaning legal question was whether the arrangement
made the railroad the "producer" of the coal within the meaning of
the statutory exemption. The Commission concluded that the railroad
was not the "producer" and denied the exemption.' The Supreme
Court affirmed the Commission. The Court said a determination of
this sort "belongs to the usual administrative routine,"45 Congress
having "found it more efficient to delegate that function ' 46 to the
agency. It said the function of judicial review is fully performed when
the court determines there has been a fair hearing and "an application
of the statute in a just and reasoned manner. '47 The determination
having been left to the administrative body, the "delegation will be
respected and the administrative conclusion left untouched."48
Further, "[i]t is not the province of a court to absorb the
administrative functions to such an extent that the executive or
legislative agencies become mere fact-finding bodies. 49
40. Gray, 314 U.S. at 403.
41. Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, ch. 127, § 4(e)(1), 50 Stat. 72, 90 (repealed
1966).
42. Gray, 314 U.S. at 407.
43. Id. at 408.
44. Id. at 411.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 412.
47. Id. at 411.
48. Id. at 412.
49. Id.
20041 1111
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The larger (macromeaning) question presented was whether the
coal was exempt from the Code altogether because there was no sale
or other transfer of title to the coal by the producer."0 The railroad
contended that since no title ever passed, from production to
consumption, it was immaterial whether its supplier of coal was
determined to be the producer. The Court rejected the railroad's
contentions. To require a transfer of title, in the technical sense,
would have hampered the fundamental, underlying purpose of
Congress, which was to stabilize the industry through price regulation.
Further, the Act applied to "other disposal" as well as sale."1 On this
question of the fundamental meaning of the Act, the Court decided it
independently, leaving the exemption clause issues with the
Commission, subject only to the requirement that it proceed along
rational lines, and thereby introducing the allocation model of judicial
review.12
2. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.
The Hearst53 case involved the refusal of Los Angeles newspaper
publishers to bargain collectively with a union representing newsboys
who distributed their papers in the city. 4 The publishers contended
that they were not required to bargain because the employees were
not their "employees" within the meaning of that term in the National
Labor Relations Act. 5 The Act provided that "[t]he term 'employee'
shall include any employee."I6
After NLRB hearings, the Board found that the newsboys were an
integral part of the newspapers' distribution system and circulation
organization. 7  Based on those findings, it concluded that the
newsboys were employees within the Act." The Board "designated
50. Id. at 414; see also Nathanson, supra note 23, at 472-75, 473 (noting that the
real issue was the fundamental question of whether the regulatory provisions of the
statute "could be applied to deliveries of coal which involved no change in its
ownership").
51. Gray, 314 U.S. at 416; see also Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, ch. 127, § 4(e)(1),
50 Stat. 72, 90 (repealed 1966).
52. See Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 239,
263 (1955) ("[P]roperly understood the doctrine in Gray v. Powell is as traditional as
it is sound."); see also Eric Stein, Comment, Status of Captive Mines Under the
National Bituminous Coal Act, 40 Mich. L. Rev. 1093, 1093-96 & n.9 (1942) (noting
that the Commission's goal was to restrict to a minimum the "captive mine"
exemption from the Act because it had permitted approximately ten percent of all
coal produced to escape regulation, and that twenty-five percent of the coal required
by industrial consumers came from company-controlled mines).
53. NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
54. Id. at 113.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000).
56. Id.
57. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 114.
58. Id.
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appropriate units and ordered elections."59  After the union was
certified, the newspapers refused to bargain with it.60 Thereupon
Board proceedings were instituted, a hearing was held, and the Board
found the newspapers had violated the Act.6 It then ordered them to
''cease and desist from such violations and to bargain collectively with
the union."' 2
The newspapers petitioned the circuit court of appeals for review
and the Board petitioned for enforcement.63 Rejecting the Board's
analysis, the appellate court independently examined the question of
whether the newsboys were employees within the Act, decided that
the NLRA imported "common-law standards to determine that
question, and held the newsboys [were] not employees."'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the appellate
court's decision, holding that the Board's findings were not erroneous,
the newsboys were employees within the meaning of the Act, and the
newspapers were required to collectively bargain with them.6"
On the question of applying the statutory term "employee" to the
facts, the Court found that the term, like other provisions, must be
understood with reference to the purpose of the Act and the facts
involved in the economic relationship.66 Determining who are
''employees" is a task assigned primarily to the agency created by
Congress to administer the Act. "Determination of 'where all the
conditions of the relation require protection' involves inquiries for the
Board charged with this duty. . . . Resolving that question, like
determining whether unfair labor practices have been committed,
'belongs to the usual administrative routine' of the Board."67
The Court said that:
Undoubtedly questions of statutory interpretation, especially when
arising in the first instance in judicial proceedings, are for the courts
to resolve, giving appropriate weight to the judgment of those whose
special duty is to administer the questioned statute. But where the
question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a
proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must
determine it initially, the reviewing court's function is limited.68
The Court then likened the Board's determination to the
"[C]ommissioner's determination under the Longshoremen's &
Harbor Workers' Act, that a man is not a 'member of a crew' or that
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 115.
65. Id. at 135.
66. Id. at 124-25.
67. Id. at 130 (citing Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411 (1941)).
68. Id. at 130-31 (citations omitted).
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he was injured 'in the course of employment' and the Federal
Communications Commission's determination that one company is
under the 'control' of another."69  Accordingly, "the Board's
determination that specified persons are 'employees' under this Act is
to be accepted if it has 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis
in law."7
The question fundamental to the underlying purposes of the Act
(macromeaning) arose in the Court's review of the independent
decision of the appellate court that the "statute imports common-law
standards"'" to determine the question of who is an "employee." The
Court pointed out that there is no simple, uniform, and easily
applicable test which the courts have used to determine whether
persons doing work for others are either employees or independent
contractors.7 2 It also noted that common-law results may be contrary,
rather than consistent, "depending upon the state or jurisdiction
where the determination is made."73
Then it concluded: "In short, the assumed simplicity and
uniformity, resulting from the application of 'common-law standards'
does not exist."74 It said further that the statute indicates clearly "the
intent"75 that common-law standards should not apply.
Both the terms and the purposes of the statute, as well as the
legislative history, show that... [t]he Wagner Act is federal
legislation, administered by a national agency, intended to solve a
national problem on a national scale ....
*- Congress had in mind a wider field than the narrow technical
legal relation of master and servant, as the common law had worked
this out in all its variations, and at the same time a narrower one
than the entire area of rendering service to others. The question
comes down therefore to how much was included of the
intermediate region between what is clearly and unequivocally
employment, by any appropriate test, and what is as clearly
entrepreneurial enterprise and not employment.76
69. Id. at 131 (internal citations omitted).
70. Id. Despite the Court's holding, in 1948 to 1949, appellate courts reviewing
NLRB interpretations of § 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act did not apply the
Hearst allocation model. Instead, they reviewed an NLRB interpretation as a "clear-
cut" question of law for the courts to decide. Archibald Cox & John T. Dunlop,
Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 Harv.
L. Rev. 389, 430 n.129 (1950).
71. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 115.
72. Id. at 120-21.
73. Id. at 122.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 123-25. The macromeaning of legislation may be determined, of course,
by either the terms of the text itself, the underlying purposes approach, or a
combination of both, as the Court stated.
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The consequence of importing common law standards into
administration of the statute "would be ultimately to defeat, in part at
least, the achievement of the statute's objectives."" However,
"Congress no more intended to import this mass of technicality as a
controlling 'standard' for uniform national application than to refer
decision of the question outright to the local law."78
When the particular relation and its economic facts make it more
nearly one of employment than of independent business enterprise
"with respect to the ends sought to be accomplished by the
legislation,"79 these characteristics may bring the relation within the
statute's protection. In doubtful situations, applicability is to be
determined "by underlying economic facts,"8 and "with reference to
the purpose of the Act.
81
In Hearst it was of no significance that the NLRB could only issue a
cease and desist order and later petition for court enforcement.
NLRB enforcement power was not essential to the result.82
Gray and Hearst established the fundamentals of the allocation
model of scope of review:83
(1) When an agency uses its delegated authority (duty) to make a
"determination" of the meaning of a statutory term as applied in a
formal adjudication in the "usual administrative routine"
(micromeaning), and
(2) When it does so reasonably or rationally on the record and
"with reference to the purpose of the Act" (macromeaning), or
"with respect to the ends sought to be accomplished by the
legislation" (macromeaning), or with "a reasonable basis in law"
(macromeaning),
(3) A reviewing court will defer to the agency's determination.
77. Id. at 125-26.
78. Id.; see also Jaffe, supra note 52, at 253-54; Nathanson, supra note 23, at 475
(noting that the Court decided independently the fundamental question of whether
the term "employee" was used in contradistinction to the term "independent
contractor," and that the Court concluded it was not so used and left application of
"employee" in specific cases to the Board, so long as its determination was supported
by the record and had "a reasonable basis in law").
79. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 128.
80. Id. at 129.
81. Id.
82. But see Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo.
L.J. 833, 890-91 (2001).
83. See, e.g., Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority
Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the
Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 993, 1029 (1986)
(asserting that for administrative law purposes, the Supreme Court settled the
standard of review question in the early twentieth century in cases like Gray and
Hearst by reviewing ultimate factfinding for reasonableness).
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3. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc.
That the allocation model also applied to legislative rulemaking is
illustrated by Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products Inc.,' decided in
the same year as Hearst. The case concerned the validity of a
regulation promulgated by the Administrator of the Fair Labor
Standards Act 5 to make effective an exemption provision in the Act
with respect to employees "within the area of production (as defined
by the Administrator), engaged in... canning of agricultural...
commodities for market."86 Eight members of the Court agreed that
by the parenthetical phrase Congress had delegated authority to the
Administrator to exercise his discretion to determine the exact
meaning to be attributed to the term "area of production"
(micromeaning).87 They also agreed he could exercise that discretion
by promulgating legislative regulations.8 Defining the term was
essential to its application by the courts in individual cases. Professor
Nathanson concluded that these 1944 regulations would have been
classified as legislative rather than interpretative for purposes of the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")8 9 enacted in 1946.90 His
perception was that they were required for application of the
exemption provision and that they "involve[d] that element of
discretion which was apparently the main reason for the hearing
procedure embodied in Section 4 [now § 553] of the Administrative
Procedure Act." '9
Even so, the Court, by a closely divided vote, held the regulation
invalid.92 The reason was that the Court determined it included an
unacceptable factor that would apply when ruling on individual
applications for exemption.93  That factor was the number of
employees engaged in a particular plant.94 The Court said that factor
was not within the administrative authority, for the structure and
detail of the statute indicated it would not bear that meaning.95
Instead, the statute required "drawing the geographic lines"96
84. 322 U.S. 607 (1944).
85. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 13(a)(10), 50 Stat. 1060 (repealed
1966).
86. Addison, 322 U.S. at 608.
87. Id. at 614.
88. Id.
89. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (2000)).
90. Nathanson, supra note 23, at 484 n.60.
91. Id.
92. Addison, 322 U.S. at 618.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 616. Text, along with the structure and detail of the legislation, was
considered by the Court to ascertain the Act's fundamental meaning that limited the
administrator's discretion. See Nathanson, supra note 23, at 483 n.58. Although
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(macromeaning). Congress had been very specific elsewhere in the
Act where other types of factors, especially numbers of employees,
had been stated to be acceptable. So long as he stayed within the
statute "Congress left the boundary-making to... the
Administrator."'97 In defining the area, the Administrator could weigh
and synthesize all relevant factors. If he did so, "judgment belongs to
him and not to the courts."98  Not having stayed within the
macromeaning of the statute, the Administrator's micromeaning
regulation was, therefore, unreasonable and invalid.
B. Agency Determinations Based on Executive Authority
1. Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
Skidmore99 is the common contemporary reference for the quite
different model of scope of review noted by Professor Nathanson.
Actually, there were many other cases that illustrated or recognized
the principle. 1°0 That is, an interpretation of a statute by the official or
agency given primary responsibility for its administration based on its
executive authority is entitled to respectful consideration by the
reviewing court. Pursuant to this approach, the ultimate test of the
validity of the agency executive authority interpretation is whether the
reviewing court is convinced (persuaded) it is correct. 1 ' In short, the
reviewing court acts in its ultimate Marbury role to "say what the law
is." In doing so, it is deciding the question independently, without any
legal obligation to the agency, for the agency has not acted on the
basis of delegated legislative or judicial authority. The reviewing
court defers or yields to the agency only to the extent it is persuaded
that the agency's executive, authority-based interpretation should be
given total or partial recognition in the outcome. Here there is no
formal allocation of lawmaking authority as there is in the Gray-
Hearst allocation model, for the agency has not taken action that
would speak with the force of law.
Skidmore concerned a lawsuit filed in federal district court under
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").' Seven of defendant's
Justice Frankfurter (for the Court) and Justice Rutledge (dissenting) agree there is an
area of discretion and disagree as to what the bounds of that discretion are, "they
have no difficulty in isolating the particular issue of statutory interpretation which the
Court is called upon to determine, by exercise of its own independent judgment." Id.
97. Addison, 322 U.S. at 614.
98. Id.
99. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
100. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944); McLaren v.
Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1921); Webster v. Luther, 163 U.S. 331, 342 (1896);
Brown v. United States, 113 U.S. 568, 571 (1885); United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760,
763 (1878).
101. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
102. Id. at 135.
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daytime employees sought to recover, under an oral agreement of
employment, overtime pay for additional time they spent on the
defendant's premises or within hailing distance while plaintiffs were
on-call for the defendant." 3 The plaintiffs were not required to
perform any specific tasks during these periods of time, except to
answer fire alarms. 1" 4
The trial court found the evidentiary facts as stipulated by the
parties, but it made no findings of fact as to whether, under the
arrangement and the circumstances of the case, the fire-hall duty or
any part thereof constituted working time.105  The court "said,
however, as a 'conclusion of law' that 'the time plaintiffs spent in the
fire-hall subject to call ... does not constitute hours worked, for which
overtime compensation is due them under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, as interpreted by the Administrator and the Courts."' 1 6 The
court of appeals affirmed. 107
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to
the district court for further proceedings. 108 Justice Jackson, writing
for the Court, began by stating that no principle of law in either the
FLSA or a decision of the Court precluded "waiting time from also
being working time."' 1 9 Whether in a concrete case waiting time is
within the Act is a question of fact to be decided by the trial court: 110
"The law does not impose an arrangement upon the parties. It
imposes upon the courts the task of finding what the arrangement
was."
111
Getting to implementation of the FLSA, the Court pointed out that
"Congress did not utilize the services of an administrative agency to
find facts and to determine in the first instance whether particular
cases fall within or without the Act. Instead, it put this responsibility
on the courts." ' Clearly, therefore, the office of Administrator,
created to implement the Act, had no delegated adjudicatory
authority "to determine" as did the agencies in Gray and Hearst.
Instead, the Administrator was empowered to inform himself of
conditions in employment and industries. It put on him the duty of
bringing injunction actions in the courts to restrain violations. Neither
did he have delegated power to promulgate general legislative rules."3
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 136.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 140.
109. Id. at 136.
110. Id. at 136-37.
111. Id. at 137.
112. Id.
113. See Samuel Herman, The Administration and Enforcement of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 6 Law & Contemp. Probs. 368, 378-81 (1939).
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Delegated legislative power may be assumed, erroneously, for in the
Court's cases, including the 2000 decision in Christensen v. Harris
County,"4 there are Code of Federal Regulations ("CFR") references
to FLSA regulations.'15 Also, Justice Jackson did not address the
point in the Court's opinion. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert illustrates
that "guidelines" lacking the force of law may, nevertheless, appear in
the CFR. 116
Apparently, there was, at least initially, very limited and quite
specific rulemaking authority delegated to the Administrator in some
portions of the FLSA. However, there was delegated no broad
rulemaking power that would confer on him discretion to determine
general applications of the Act."7 Thus, the Administrator had only
the delegated executive authority described above.
The Court continued: "He has set forth his views of the application
of the Act under different circumstances in an interpretative bulletin
and in informal rulings. They provide a practical guide to employers
and employees as to how the office representing the public interest in
its enforcement will seek to apply it.""' 8
Next, Justice Jackson pointed out there was "no statutory provision
as to what, if any, deference courts should pay to the Administrator's
conclusions.""' 9 The Administrator believed "the problems presented
by inactive duty require[d] a flexible solution."' °  His Bulletin
attempted to suggest standards and examples for guidance in
particular situations.12' However, the facts of Skidmore were not
within any of the specific examples. In his amicus curiae brief the
Administrator concluded that sleeping and eating time should be
excluded from the workweek. 2' Justice Jackson made clear that the
views of the Administrator were not conclusive, even in the cases with
which they directly dealt, and that "[t]hey do not constitute an
interpretation of the Act or a standard for judging factual situations
which binds a district court's processes," '123 although they do establish
the executive interpretations of the Act that will guide the
Administrator's applications for enforcement by injunction.
114. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
115. Id.
116. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143, 156, 158 (1976).
117. See Herman, supra note 113, at 378-81. In section 29(b) of the Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1974, Congress delegated authority to the Secretary of
Labor to prescribe necessary rules, regulations and orders "with regard to the
amendments made by this Act." Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 29(b), 88 Stat. 55, 76.
118. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 138 (1944).
119. Id. at 139.
120. Id. at 138.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 139.
123. Id.
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Nevertheless, the Administrator's policies and standards were
entitled to respect in the same sense that the Court "has long given
considerable and in some cases decisive weight to Treasury Decisions
and to interpretative regulations of the Treasury and of other
bodies." '24 Justice Jackson concluded this part of the Court's opinion
with the statement that the Administrator's "rulings, interpretations
and opinions do not control the courts by reason of their authority."'25
They are a body with experienced and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.'26 Then follows
the famous statement that the weight given the Administrator's
judgment by a court "in a particular case" '127 will depend on its
"thoroughness," "reasoning,' ''consistency," "and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.' '12 8
This enumeration does not appear to constitute a precise calculus of
factors for guidance of the courts. I perceive it to be a statement of
illustration of factors that may be contracted or expanded by the
specific facts and by other factors that might be relevant "in a
particular case." '129
2. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert3 ' follows Skidmore in a similar
context. The Court held that in enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Congress "did not confer upon the [Equal Employment
Opportunity] Commission authority to promulgate rules or
regulations pursuant to that Title."13' Nevertheless, as in Skidmore,
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") guidelines
were "entitled to consideration in determining legislative intent ....
But it does mean that courts properly may accord less weight to such
guidelines than to administrative regulations which Congress has
declared shall have the force of law." '132 The Court stated that the
124. Id. at 140.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.; see also Nathanson, supra note 23, at 470. The familiar Skidmore doctrine
is distinct from the limited judicial review of agency legal determinations illustrated
by the leading case Gray v. Powell and expressed as the allocation model of judicial
review.
129. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
130. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
131. Id. at 141.
132. Id.; see also Claudia G. Allen & Jean C. Powers, Note, Sex Discrimination-
Court Narrows Gilbert-Some Pregnancy Discrimination Is Sex Related, 27 Buff. L.
Rev. 295, 314 (1978). For Skidmore deference review of agency interpretations
lacking the force of law, and not set aside in toto, such interpretations may be
apportioned and different weights assigned the portions. In Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty, the Court said: "In Gilbert, we rejected another portion of this same
guideline.... We did not, however, set completely at naught the weight to be given
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EEOC guidelines were interpretative rulings as were those in
Skidmore. After quoting the Skidmore factors paragraph in full, the
Court said that "[tihe EEOC guidelines do not fare well under these
standards." '133 However, it introduced another standard or factor-
"contemporaneous interpretation"' 34
-and applied it along with the
consistency standard in the Skidmore list.
There also were other indicia of the meaning of Title VII with
which the EEOC guidelines "sharply"' 35 conflicted. They conflicted
with the legislative history and with an interpretative regulation
promulgated by the Wage and Hour Administrator under the Equal
Pay Act. In sum, the Court concluded the EEOC guideline "stands
virtually alone."'36
Skidmore and General Electric confirm the earlier principle that
courts will give respectful consideration, and, perhaps, deference to
the statutory interpretations of an administrative agent, ultimately
tested by the court's independent judgment as to whether the
administrative interpretation is correct. The reviewing court acts in its
Marbury role because the intervening decision is based solely on the
agent's executive power. In this context, there is no separation of
powers issue with which the court must struggle in deciding whether it
should defer to the agent's interpretation. The agent has only its
executive authority as a platform on which to base an attempt to
persuade the court.
Therefore, Gray, Hearst and Addison deference is clearly
distinguishable from Skidmore and General Electric deference, for the
basic decision models are categorically separate and distinct. Both
models exist independently in Supreme Court precedent.'37 They do
not, therefore, represent merely different points on the same judicial
review spectrum, i.e., weak and strong deference. Finally, the
micromeaning-macromeaning allocation component of Gray-Hearst is
not employed in the Skidmore decision model, except to the extent
that the Court chooses to include the distinction in the persuasion
analysis. In my judgment, both of these decision models are essential
components of a reasonable, sound, comprehensive model of scope of
judicial review for agency statutory interpretations.
the 1972 guideline.... This portion of the 1972 Guideline is therefore entitled to
more weight than was the one considered in Gilbert." Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434
U.S. 136, 142 n.4 (1977); Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 142.
133. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 142.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 143.
136. Id. at 145.
137. See Nathanson, supra note 23, at 470-72.
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C. U.S. Supreme Court Decisions Said to Be Inconsistent with the
Allocation Model
1. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB
The conventional wisdom holds that the Packard case'38 is
inconsistent with Gray-Hearst.39 This perceived inconsistency is
asserted to be evidence of the pre-Chevron confusion in the law of
scope of review. However, analyzed differently, Packard may not
necessarily be inconsistent after all. But first, some background
information that relates to Packard.
Justice Jackson, who wrote for the majority in Packard, supported
the principles of Gray-Hearst. He joined the Court's eight-person
majority decision in Hearst. In a 1942 case, United States v. Carolina
Freight Carriers Corp.,In° he and Justice Frankfurter dissented on the
ground that the Court's decision was inconsistent with the deference
principle of Gray, having given it only lip service.14 Further, Justice
Jackson is known to have preferred the plain meaning method of
statutory interpretation. All the justices in the Packard majority had
joined the majority decision in Hearst. Two of the four Packard
dissenters had been in the Hearst majority. Hence, the Packard court
was composed of seven justices who participated in Hearst, and all of
them had been in the Hearst majority.
Packard concerned agency interpretation of the National Labor
Relations Act, as did Hearst. In fact, it involved the same statutory
term-"employees"-that was the focus of Hearst.42 In Hearst, the
National Labor Relations Board decided that the term applied to the
publishers' newsboys. The Supreme Court affirmed, deferring to the
Board's judgment. In Packard, the Board determined that
"employee" applied to foremen. The Supreme Court decided,
independently, that the Board was correct and ordered enforcement
of its decision. The Court did not defer to, nor did it mention, the
deference principle of Hearst. In fact, the majority did not cite Hearst.
The Douglas dissent cited Hearst solely for the proposition that
"employee" "must be considered in the context of the Act." '14 3 Thus
the dissenters said the majority's decision model was inconsistent with
Hearst. However, there is more to Packard than review of a Board
decision simply defining the term "employee." Packard required
defining the term in the larger context of a potential conflict with the
138. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
139. See, e.g., John G. Osborn, Comment, Legal Philosophy and Judicial Review of
Agency Statutory Interpretation, 36 Harv. J. on Legis. 115, 142 (1999) (discussing "the
odd dynamic between Hearst and Packard").
140. 315 U.S. 475 (1942).
141. Id. at 490 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
142. Packard, 330 U.S. at 486.
143. Id. at 495 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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statutory term "employer." The legislative language stated that "[t]he
term 'employee' shall include any employee,"'1 44 and "[t]he term
'employer' includes any person acting as an agent of an employer,
directly or indirectly."' 45
The question before the Court was whether the two terms "classify
the operating group of industry into two classes; what is included in
one group is excluded from the other.' 1 46 This was the dissenting
viewpoint. Or, whether because foremen are also employees "[t]he
context of the Act... leaves no room for a construction of this section
[employer] to deny the organizational privilege to employees because
they act in the interest of an employer.' 1 47 This was the majority
viewpoint. Manifestly, to consider only the single term "employee" in
making this decision would be to attempt to answer half a question.
Neither the majority nor the dissenters did so.
The Board had dutifully applied the term "employee" to the facts
developed in the proceeding and had concluded that foremen were
also employees and could organize. 48 Viewing the case as review of
an initial decision by an agency applying a statutory term would seem
to bring it within Hearst, as presenting a micromeaning question to
which, if reasonable, the Court should defer. But, instead, the Court
majority viewed the case as presenting a macromeaning question that
required reconciliation of key statutory terms concerning the
fundamental, underlying goals and purposes of the Act. 149  The
question, therefore, is analogous to the Court's independent decision
in Hearst that common law standards for determining employment
were not imported into the National Labor Relations Act. Since
deference is not relevant to deciding this macromeaning question,
there is no more reason to cite Hearst than there is to cite Marbury.
The tension in Packard is among members of the Court at this
bedrock level of the meaning of the statute. The majority insisted that
the "plain terms" of the Act leave it to Congress, and not the Court,
"to create exceptions or qualifications at odds with its plain terms. '150
Also, "[t]here is, however, no ambiguity in this Act to be clarified by
resort to legislative history"'51 and, policy matters "concern the
wisdom of the legislation; they cannot alter the meaning of otherwise
plain provisions."'52
Even so, the majority did recognize one micromeaning issue of
application, and it deferred to the Board's interpretation. The
144. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)-(3) (2000).
145. Id. § 152(2).
146. Packard, 330 U.S. at 495.
147. Id. at 488.
148. Id. at 491.
149. Jaffe, supra note 52, at 254-57.
150. Packard, 330 U.S. at 490.
151. Id. at 492.
152. Id. at 493.
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question was whether the Act prohibited foremen as a class from
constituting an appropriate bargaining unit. On this question "the Act
confers upon the Board a broad discretion to determine appropriate
units."'53 The majority noted the following: "It involves of necessity a
large measure of informed discretion, and a decision of the Board, if
not final, is rarely to be disturbed."'5 It held that the Board's
bargaining unit decision was valid because it was supported by the
evidence and was reasonable in law.
While still speaking of the bargaining unit issue, it said:
Whatever special questions there are in determining the appropriate
bargaining unit for foremen are for the Board, and the history of the
issue in the Board shows the difficulty of the problem committed to
its discretion. We are not at liberty to be governed by those policy
considerations in deciding the naked question of law whether the
Board is now, in this case, acting within the terms of the statute. 55
Consideration of the context in which this "naked question of law"
statement was made indicates the phrase refers to the fundamental,
underlying macromeaning of the statute.
The dissent refers to "the basic policy questions which underlie the
present decision" '56 and states that "tremendously important policy
questions are involved in the present decision." '57 Also, it questions
whether Congress "had in mind such a basic change in industrial
philosophy. 1 58  Turning to legislative history, the dissent said, "we
find no trace of Congressional concern with the problems of
supervisory personnel."'59 Turning to related legislation, "we find that
when Congress desired to include managerial officials or supervisory
personnel in the category of employees, it did so expressly."'"
Concerning policy issues, Justice Douglas said, "I am sure that those
problems were not in the consciousness of Congress .... The
153. Id. at 491.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 492-93; see Jaffe, supra note 52, at 273.
The importance of the question to be resolved is sometimes thought of as an
independent touchstone of reviewability .... [I]f the question is
"important" enough the court may undertake to settle it even though the
court holds no clear view of the question .... Importance might probably
be defined.., in terms of the purposes of the statute. Packard, for example
involved a question which reached to the roots of the statutory philosophy of
collective bargaining. Understood in this sense "importance" is a crucial
factor .... In Packard the matter was indeed of great importance.., in the
sense suggested above of its relation to the basic issues and purposes of the
act.
Id.
156. Packard, 330 U.S. at 494 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 495.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 498.
160. Id. at 499.
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question is so important that I cannot believe Congress legislated
unwittingly on it.'' 6.
There does not appear in the dissent a single sentence discussing the
delegated power of the agency or the reasonableness of its decision at
a micromeaning level. Everything considered and every question
addressed is at the fundamental, underlying purposes, macromeaning
level of the National Labor Relations Act.
61
Therefore, I conclude that Packard is consistent with Gray-Hearst,
for the Court perceived the issue before it to be at the macromeaning
level, the Marbury level. Its independent judgment reconciling two
key terms in major national legislation was quite appropriate and was
consistent with Court precedents.
2. Social Security Board v. Nierotko
About one year before Packard, the Court decided Social Security
Board v. Nierotko.163 Nierotko "was found by the National Labor
Relations Board to have been wrongfully discharged for union activity
by his employer, the Ford Motor Company."'" 6 He was reinstated in
his employment by the Board with directions for "back pay" for the
period he was discharged. 165 The "back pay" was paid by the
employer and Nierotko requested the Social Security Board to credit
his old age and survivor's insurance account with the sum of the "back
pay."'" The Board refused to credit Nierotko's "back pay" as
wages.167 On judicial review, the district court upheld the Board. 68
The court of appeals reversed and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.1 6
9
All eight participating justices of the Supreme Court agreed that the
question before it addressed the fundamental, underlying
macromeaning of the Social Security Act. The Act defined "wages"
for old age benefits as "all remuneration for employment, including
the cash value of all remuneration paid in any medium other than
cash."' 70  It defined the term "employment" as "any service, of
whatever nature, performed within the United States by an employee
for his employer."''
161. Id. at 500.
162. See Jaffe, supra note 52, at 263-64.
163. 327 U.S. 358 (1946).
164. Id. at 359.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 360.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 210(a), 49 Stat. 620, 625
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 409 (2000)).
171. Id. § 210(b).
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First, the Court explained that federal old age benefits are to
provide funds for the "decent support of elderly workmen who have
ceased to labor."' 72 Eligibility for benefits depends upon the total
wages which the employee has received and the periods in which they
were paid. 173 The Court continued that while neither the legislative
history of the Act and its amendments nor the language of the
amendments themselves deals with whether such "back pay" is to be
treated as wages under the Act:
[W]e think it plain that an individual who is an employee under the
Labor Act and who receives "back pay" for a period of time during
which he was wrongfully separated from his job, is entitled to have
that award of back pay treated as wages under the Social Security
Act... as "remuneration for employment and employment as any
service... performed.., by an employee for his employer ....
Thus, "'back pay' is based upon the loss of wages which the employee
has suffered from the employer's wrong., 175 It is not a fine or penalty
imposed on the employer by the Board.
It was urged that Nierotko did not perform any service for the back
pay, but the Court responded as follows:
We are unable, however, to follow the Social Security Board in such
a limited circumscription of the word "service." The very words
"any service... performed... for his employer," with the purpose
of the Social Security Act in mind, import breadth of coverage....
We think that "service" as used by Congress in this definitive phrase
means not only work actually done but the entire employer-
employee relationship for which compensation is paid to the
employee by the employer.
76
Referring to Gray-Hearst deference, the Court said administrative
determinations must have a basis in law "and must be within the
granted authority. 17 7 Congress could have decided this question or it
might have delegated to the Social Security Board authority to
determine what compensation paid by employers should be treated as
wages. The Court noted, however, that "[e]xcept as such
interpretative power may be included in the agencies' administrative
functions, Congress did neither. An agency may not finally decide the
limits of its statutory power. That is a judicial function."' 78 The Court
recognized that there may be borderline payments to employees on
which courts would follow administrative determinations. It
concluded: "[T]he Board's interpretation of this statute to exclude
172. Nierotko, 327 U.S. at 364.
173. Id
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 365-66.
177. Id. at 369.
178. Id.
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back pay goes beyond the boundaries of administrative routine and
the statutory limits. This is a ruling which excludes.., payments
which we think were included by Congress. It is beyond the
permissible limits of administrative interpretation.'
79
Although mentioned by the Court, Gray-Hearst deference was
irrelevant. The Court considered the question to be at the
fundamental, underlying purposes level of the meaning of the Social
Security Act. As such, it was a question for the Court to decide
independently. Whether the agency made a "reasonable"
determination of the question was not important, for the outcome was
controlled by the macromeaning, as determined independently by the
Court, in its Marbury role.
3. NLRB v. Highland Park Manufacturing Co.
NLRB v. Highland Park Manufacturing Co. 80 is another case that
is said to illustrate the Court's refusal to defer to an agency's
legislative interpretation. 8' The question was whether § 9(h) of the
National Labor Relations Act applied to the A.F. of L. and C.I.O.' 8
The provision barred the NLRB from considering petitions or issuing
complaints at the request of a labor organization unless certain
conditions were met. Each of its officers and the officers of any
national or international labor organization with which it was
affiliated were required to have filed with the Board an affidavit that
the officer was not a member of the Communist Party.'83
The officers of the Textile Workers Union had filed the requisite
affidavits, but the officers of the C.I.O., with which the Union was
affiliated, had not done so. 1"4 The Board ruled that it could,
nevertheless, entertain the Textile Workers Union petition filed by
the Union and order Highland Manufacturing Company to bargain
with it.' The courts of appeals had split on the question in other
cases.'86 The Supreme Court ruled that the Board could not act on the
charge filed by this Union.'87
Justice Jackson wrote for the Court. Again using his preferred
plain meaning approach, he began:
179. Id. at 369-70.
180. 341 U.S. 322 (1951).
181. See Stephen G. Breyer & Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law and
Regulatory Policy 273 n.19 (2d ed. 1985); Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law 659
(2d ed. 1984).
182. Highland Park, 341 U.S. at 323-24.
183. Id. at 323.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 324.
186. See id.
187. Id.
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The definition of "labor union" in the statute concededly includes
the C.I.O. It is further conceded that the phrase "labor organization
national or international in scope" as found in § 10(c) refers to the
A.F. of L. and the C.I.O. (Italics added.) But it is claimed that when
the adjectives "national" or "international" are alone added, they
exclude the C.I.O., because it is regarded in labor circles as a
federation rather than a national or international union. We think,
however, that the use of geographic terms to reach nation-wide or
more than nation-wide unions does not exclude those of some
particular technical structure.... If Congress intended geographic
adjectives to have a structural connotation or to have other than
their ordinarily accepted meaning, it would and should have given
them a special meaning by definition.
1 88
He continued:
As the Courts of Appeals for both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits
have said, the congressional purpose was to "wholly eradicate and
bar from leadership in the American labor movement, at each and
every level, adherents to the Communist party and believers in the
unconstitutional overthrow of our Government." It would require
much clearer language of exemption to justify holding that the very
top levels of influence and actual power in the labor movement in
this country were untouched while only the lower levels were
affected.18 9
The Court, therefore, disagreed with the Board's interpretation of
the legislation, but it did not invade the area of micromeaning or
specific application ordinarily allocated to the agency. Here the Court
determined the fundamental meaning, the underlying purposes, of the
amendment to the NLRA eliminating Communists from union
leadership positions. This is a macromeaning issue, and properly is to
be decided independently by the Court according to the doctrine of
Gray-Hearst.
The thrust of the dissents of Justices Frankfurter and Douglas was
to take the Jackson majority to task for refusing to use the legislative
history of the Act and other extrinsic aids as guides to the underlying
meaning of the legislation. 190 Justice Frankfurter makes clear that he
views the question as one of micromeaning application for the
Board.'91
He said:
The best source for us in determining whether a term used in the
field of industrial relations has a technical connotation is the body to
which Congress has committed the administration of the statute.
Certainly, if there is no reasonable ground for rejecting the
188. Id. at 324-25.
189. Id. at 325.
190. See id. at 326-28 (Frankfurter & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
191. See id.
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determination of the National Labor Relations Board, its view
should not be rejected. 92
That would be true, if the issue had been considered by the Court
majority to be one of specific application of a statutory term.
In conclusion, Justice Frankfurter referred to a Board decision
consistent with his view and said: "Nothing called to our attention has
put in question this authoritative finding by the National Labor
Relations Board. We ought not, therefore, to reject it." '193 If he had
persuaded a majority of the Court that the question should have been
perceived to be a micromeaning issue as he stated, the Court should
have, and probably would have, deferred to the Board. The deference
principle of Gray-Hearst then would have applied.
Justice Douglas said there was no answer to the Frankfurter
analysis
if objectivity is our standard and if the expertise of administrative
agencies is to continue as our guide .... Until today the test has
been not whether the construction would be our own if we sat as the
Board, but whether it has a reasonable basis in custom, practice, or
legislative history.1 94
Again, he and Justice Frankfurter would have been correct if the
Court majority had been convinced the question was one of
micromeaning application for the Board.
Justice Jackson would respond, of course, that the Board's
interpretation would be given respectful consideration and weight, but
that it would not be controlling on a question involving the underlying
policy and purposes of the amendment to the NLRA.
4. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.'95 serves as a final example of a case
said to evidence Court inconsistency by refusing to defer to an agency
determination. 96 In this case, the union representing the company's
workers petitioned the NLRB for an election to determine whether it
could be certified as the bargaining representative of the buyers at a
192. Id. at 327.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 327-28 (citing NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944);
Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941)); see Jaffe, supra note 52, at 266-67. Professor
Jaffe said the Douglas dissent suggested that the expertise of the agency is a factor of
independent significance sufficient to override the considered opinion of the Court.
In Jaffe's view, such a position would be unsound: "Where the meaning of a statute is
involved, special knowledge, constituting as it does only a part of the material for
judgment, can never be the sole determinant. In judicial review, the court must
evaluate the relevance and weight of expertness." Id. at 267.
195. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
196. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr. et al., Administrative Law and Process 375 (3d ed.
1999).
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company plant. 97 The company opposed the petition, asserting that
the buyers, as "managerial employees," were not covered by the
National Labor Relations Act.'98 The Board held that Congress
intended to exclude from the Act only those "managerial employees"
whose participation in a labor union would create a conflict with their
job responsibilities, and ordered the company to bargain with the
union.' 9
The court of appeals denied enforcement of the Board's order,
concluding that Congress had intended to exclude all true "managerial
employees" from the protection of the Act."'0 The court added,
however, that the Board would not be precluded from determining
that buyers or some types of buyers are not true "managerial
employees" and, therefore, are covered by the Act.20 1 The Board
petitioned the Supreme Court for review.2 °"
The Court noted, initially, that supervisory employees are expressly
excluded from the Act in § 2(11).203 While speaking about the
subsequent legislative reversal of the Packard decision in the Taft-
Hartley Act, the Court said the Douglas dissent in Packard "is
especially pertinent."2" Accordingly, the majority referred to and
quoted from it extensively. All the references and quotes from the
dissent address the fundamental, underlying goals and purposes of the
NLRA. Indeed, as stated earlier, there is nothing other than
fundamental, underlying goals and purposes language in the Douglas
dissent in Packard.
Both the House and Senate Reports on the Taft-Hartley Act
''voiced concern over the Board's broad reading of the term
cemployee' to include those clearly within the managerial
hierarchy.""0 5  The Senate Report focused on the Douglas dissent.
The House Report said that "[w]hen Congress passed the Labor Act,
we were concerned, as we said in its preamble, with the welfare of
'workers' and 'wage earners,' not of the boss. ' 216
The Court also said:
The Court of Appeals in the instant case put the issue well:
"Congress recognized there were other persons so much more
clearly 'managerial' that it was inconceivable that the Board would
treat them as employees. Surely Congress could not have supposed
197. Bell, 416 U.S. at 269.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 272.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 273.
202. Id. at 274.
203. Id. at 274 n.4.
204. Id. at 278.
205. Id. at 281.
206. Id. at 282 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 80-245, at 13 (1947)).
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that, while 'confidential secretaries' could not be organized, their
bosses could be. In other words, Congress failed to enact the
portion of Mr. Justice Douglas' Packard dissent relating to the
organization of executives, not because it disagreed but because it
deemed this unnecessary., 20 7
In its footnote thirteen, the Court said: "In addition, the dissent [in
this case] completely ignores the fundamental change in industrial
philosophy which would be accomplished through unionization of
'managerial employees. '' 2 8 Furthermore, "[e]xtension of the Act to
cover true 'managerial employees' would indeed be revolutionary, for
it would eviscerate the traditional distinction between labor and
management. If Congress intended a result so drastic, it is not
unreasonable to expect that it would have said so expressly.,
209
The majority also quoted from a 1956 Board opinion: "It was the
clear intent of Congress to exclude from the coverage of the Act all
individuals allied with management.""21 Referring again to that 1956
opinion, the majority pointed out that until a 1970 decision, the Board
consistently followed this reading of the Act: "It never certified any
unit of 'managerial employees,' separate or otherwise, and repeatedly
stated that it was Congress' intent that such employees not be
accorded bargaining rights under the Act. And it was this reading
which was permitted to stand when Congress again amended the Act
in 1959.
"211
Finally, the Court declared:
In sum, the Board's early decisions, the purpose and legislative
history of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, the Board's subsequent and
consistent construction of the Act for more than two decades, and
the decisions of the courts of appeals all point unmistakably to the
conclusion that "managerial employees" are not covered by the Act.
We agree with the Court of Appeals below that the Board is not
now free to read a new and more restrictive meaning into the Act.212
And, in its footnote eighteen:
The contrary interpretation of the Act urged by the dissent would
have far-reaching results. Although a shop foreman would be
excluded from the Act, a wide range of executives would be
included .... If Congress intended the unionization of such
executives, it most certainly would have made its design plain.213
It seems clear that the Court majority viewed the issue as one
concerning the fundamental, underlying purposes of the statute.
207. Id. at 284 (citation omitted).
208. Id. at 285 n.13.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 287 (quoting Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752,753-54 (1956)).
211. Id. at 287-88.
212. Id. at 289.
213. Id. at 296-97 (White, J., dissenting).
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Thus, from their perspective it was a question for the Court to decide
independently.
The dissenters argued that although Congress excluded particular
groups, it did not intend to exclude in express terms the entire
category of "managerial employees. ' 214 The dissent closed with the
following statement:
But this Court has consistently said that it will accept the Board's
determination of whether a particular individual is an "employee"
under the Act if that determination has "'warrant in the record' and
a reasonable basis in law." There is no reason here to hamstring the
Board and deny a broad category of employees those protections of
the Act which neither the statutory language nor its legislative
history requires simply because the Board at one time interpreted
the Act-erroneously it seems to me-to exclude all managerial as
well as supervisory employees.215
What the dissent says, of course, is correct, if a majority of the
Court were to agree that the question presented was a micromeaning
application issue as was presented in Hearst. Here, it seems clear the
majority thought it was a question addressing the fundamental
macromeaning of the statute, and, consistent with Hearst, they
decided it independently.
D. A Supreme Court Prelude to Chevron
Just six months before Chevron, and in the same term, a unanimous
Supreme Court decided Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v.
Federal Labor Relations Authority,216 in which the Court virtually
wrote an essay restating the basic allocation principles of scope of
judicial review of agency legislative interpretations.
Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 requires federal
agencies to grant "official time" to employees representing their
union in collective bargaining with the agencies. The grant of
official time allows the employee negotiators to be paid as if they
were at work, whenever they bargain during hours when they would
otherwise be on duty. The Federal Labor Relations Authority
concluded that the grant of official time also entitles employee union
representatives to a per diem allowance and reimbursement for
travel expenses incurred in connection with collective bargaining. In
this case, the Court of Appeals... enforced an [Federal Labor
Relations Authority ("FLRA")] order requiring an agency to pay a
214. Id. (citing NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 251, 260 (1968) (White, J.,
dissenting); NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944)).
215. Id. at 311 (citing United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 260 (White, J., dissenting); Hearst,
322 U.S. at 131).
216. 464 U.S. 89 (1983).
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union negotiator travel expenses and a per diem, finding the
Authority's interpretation of the statute "reasonably defensible. 
217
The Authority adjudicates various types of labor-management
disputes, and, in addition, may engage in legislative rulemaking.218 It
also is specifically required to "'provide leadership in establishing
policies and guidance relating to matters' arising under the Act. '219 It
''may seek enforcement of its adjudicatory orders in the ... courts of
appeals."2  Furthermore, "persons, including federal agencies,
aggrieved by any final FLRA decision may also seek judicial
review. ,
22 1
The facts of the case were as follows: The Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms ("BATF") maintained a regional office in
Lodi, California, and notified the union representing BATF
employees stationed in Lodi that it intended to move the office to
Sacramento and establish a reduced duty post in Lodi. The union
notified the agency that it wanted "to negotiate aspects of the move's
impact on employees in the bargaining unit. '222  The designated
employee agent for these negotiations "asked that his participation in
the discussions be classified as 'official time,"' but the agency denied
his request and directed him to take either annual leave or leave
without pay for the day of the meeting.223 The union then filed an
unfair labor practice charge with the FLRA, claiming that BATF had
improperly compelled its agent to take annual leave for the sessions.
224
While the charge was pending, "the FLRA issued an 'Interpretation
and Guidance' of general applicability which required federal
agencies to pay salaries, travel expenses, and per diem allowances to
union representatives engaged in collective bargaining with the
"1221
agencies.
Meanwhile, "[b]ased on the [union's] pending charge against
BATF, the Authority issued a complaint and notice of hearing. "226
The union amended its complaint to add a claim that the employee
should also have been paid his travel expenses and a per diem
allowance.2 7 After a formal hearing, the administrative law judge
("AL"), bound to follow the FLRA "Interpretation and Guidance,"
concluded that BATF had committed an unfair labor practice by
217. Id. at 90-91 (citations omitted).
218. Id. at 92-93.
219. Id. at 93 (internal quotations omitted).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 94.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 95.
227. Id.
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failing to comply with the statute.228  Accordingly, he ordered the
agency to pay the employee's regular salary for the day in question, as
well as his travel costs and a per diem allowance. 229  The FLRA
affirmed the ALJ's decision, adopted his "findings, conclusions, and
recommended relief."23 The Supreme Court granted review of the
Court of Appeals' enforcement order.3
The Court initially described the Authority as follows:
Like the National Labor Relations Board,... FLRA was intended
to develop specialized expertise in its field of labor relations and to
use that expertise to give content to the principles and goals set forth
in the Act. Consequently, the Authority is entitled to considerable
deference when it exercises its "special function of applying the
general provisions of the Act to the complexities" of federal labor
relations.232
Here, the FLRA had done so in a formal adjudication as the NLRB
had done in Hearst.
The Court continued:
On the other hand, the "deference owed to an expert tribunal
cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which results in the
unauthorized assumption by an agency of major policy decisions
properly made by Congress." Accordingly, while reviewing courts
should uphold reasonable and defensible constructions of an
agency's enabling Act[,J they must not "rubber-stamp...
administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory
mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a
statute." Guided by these principles, we turn to a consideration of
the FLRA's construction of [the relevant section]. [A]n agency
acting within its authority to make policy choices consistent with the
congressional mandate should receive considerable deference from
courts, provided, of course, that its actions conform to applicable
procedural requirements and are not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or not otherwise in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A). When an agency's decision is premised on its
understanding of a specific congressional intent, however, it engages
in the quintessential judicial function of deciding what a statute
means. In that case, the agency's interpretation, particularly to the
extent it rests on factual premises within its expertise, may be
influential, but it cannot bind a court [citing General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert and Skidmore v. Swift & Co.] ... [thus,] "we conclude that
the FLRA's decision in this case neither rests on specific
228. Id. at 95-96.
229. Id. at 95.
230. Id. at 96.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 97 (citations omitted).
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congressional intent nor is consistent with the policies underlying the
Act."
23 3
In its footnote thirteen, the Court again analogized to the NLRB
and further recognized the micromeaning-macromeaning distinction:
"[T]here are undoubtedly areas in which the FLRA, like the National
Labor Relations Board, enjoys considerable freedom to apply its
expertise to new problems, provided it remains faithful to the
fundamental policy choices made by Congress., 234 Thus, the Court
concluded "that the FLRA's interpretation.., constitutes an
'unauthorized assumption by [the] agency of [a] major policy
decisio[n] properly made by Congress. '-235
E. Summary of Pre-Chevron Scope of Review
There are other cases that could be included in a study of the scope
of review of agency interpretation of legislative language. Lists of
independent judicial judgment cases and judicial deference cases have
been compiled.236  The lists of cases have been contrasted in an
attempt to demonstrate the pre-Chevron judicial inconsistency and
chaos in the field. Nevertheless, a careful reading of the cases
demonstrates that there is, indeed, a central theme that runs through
them. That theme is the micromeaning-macromeaning allocation
model developed in Gray and Hearst.
In some cases, the style or approach taken in the Court's opinion
may induce confusion. The Court may simply state that its role is to
determine the reasonableness of the agency action. In others, the
Court may first state the limits (the poles, the underlying purpose, the
extremes) of the legislation and then announce whether the agency
acted within those limits. If the action is within the limits, the Court
then decides whether the agency action was reasonable. In other
cases the Court indicates that it is deciding, independently, the
underlying meaning of the legislation. In still other cases, either
deference or independent judgment may be signaled by a simple
statement that reasonableness controls or that courts interpret
legislation. Differences in style or approach, and simplicity or
complexity in an opinion should not be allowed to camouflage what,
in fact, the Court has done.
Another possible reason for confusion is the fact that there are no
clear-cut criteria by which to distinguish a micromeaning question
from a macromeaning question and to make the appropriate
233. Id. at 97-98 & n.8 (citations omitted).
234. Id. at 103 n.13.
235. Id. at 108 (quoting Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965)
(alterations in original)).
236. See Bloomberg, supra note 34, at 113; Eric M. Braun, Note, Coring the
Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretation of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 87 Colum. L.
Rev. 986, 987-90 (1987).
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allocation. On a spectrum between these two poles, it is a matter of
degree, a question of predominance as to which type of question is
presented. In many situations the distinction may be apparent, but in
others it may be obscure. Therefore, reviewing courts may need to
make use of other aids to arrive at a determination.237 The task is
similar to distinguishing between rulemaking and adjudication or
distinguishing between legislative rules and interpretative rules-a
matter of degree. Nevertheless, by whatever criteria they apply, the
Justices do make the choice and join the coalition representing that
choice. The perception of the largest coalition will control the
analysis. In United States v. Mead Corp.,238 Justice Souter recognized
the spectrum problem and accepted it: "Judges in other, perhaps
237. See Jaffe, supra note 52, at 261-64, 276. Professor Jaffe asserts that "clear
statutory purpose" should be the primary or basic criterion for purposes of allocating
between the agency and the reviewing court primary authority to determine legal
issues. Id. Even so, he believed there were additional considerations which determine
its application. They are: (1) the degree to which the determination appears to
depend on expertise, (2) the clarity with which a determination can be made to
emerge and be given a stable form and content, (3) the importance of the
determination in the statutory and administrative scheme (i.e., the clear purposes of
the statute), (4) the possible psychological advantage of a judicial pronouncement,
and (5) the role of the reviewing court as the guardian of the integrity of the legal
system. Id. For another proposed multifactor analysis to discern congressional
delegation of interpretive authority to the agency that goes beyond statutory
ambiguity, see Braun, supra note 236, at 996-1007. Factors suggested as useful
include: special agency expertise, a required balancing of multiple statutory purposes,
and inherently broad statutory language lacking further statutory criteria or specific
statutory definitions. Id. at 997. Factors said to be not useful include: highly specific
portions of a statute that appear to conflict and contemporaneous construction of the
statute, longstanding agency interpretation, and similar expressions that go to the
persuasiveness of the agency interpretation and have no bearing on whether Congress
delegated interpretive authority to the agency. Id. at 1000. Three "danger signals"
also are identified that are said to indicate deference is less appropriate: the presence
of constitutional issues, agency interpretations of statutorily required procedures,
where an agency interpretation shapes a statute's core meaning (macromeaning), and
where an agency has a special interest in its interpretation. Id. at 999. Professor
Elizabeth Garrett advanced a third proposed multifactor list for determining whether
Congress delegated interpretive authority to the agency. See Elizabeth Garrett,
Legislating Chevron, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2637, 2649-51 (2003). The factors suggested
are: (1) the kind of question arguably delegated-is it broad or narrow, is expertise
needed on the issue, whether it depends primarily on qualitative or quantitative
assessments, and whether it relates to other areas in which the agency has broad
authority; (2) the kind of procedure authorized and used by the agency-whether
there is transparency of the process, the degree of participation by affected interests,
the legal effect of the resulting product (broadly applicable or self-enforcing); (3) who
in the agency made the decision and based on what authority; and (4) the
characteristics of the particular agency (ignored by courts)-the agency capabilities
generally, its reputation and qualifications, independent or executive branch status,
liable to capture by powerful interest groups, what sort of interest group activity is
typical, how politically salient its issues are for the general public, political pressures
brought to bear on the agency by Congress, its committees and the President, and
indications that the President, Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"), or other
executive branch officers do not trust the agency. Id.
238. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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harder, cases will make reasoned choices between the two examples,
[Chevron and Skidmore] the way courts have always done. 239
The cases reviewed, the Court's unanimous decision in BA TF, six
months before it decided Chevron-and the indication in the papers
of Justices Blackmun 24° and Marshall that the Court did not consider
Chevron to be anything special,241 persuade me that the Court did not
intend Chevron to be a revolutionary decision. However, Professor
Percival suggests the Justices did not "realiz[e] the full implications of
their landmark administrative law decision.., in Chevron. '242  As
indicated above and in the following Part III, my analysis suggests the
Court knew exactly what it was doing. The misperceptions of the case
appear to be from the lower courts and the commentators.
II. CHEVRON U.S.A., INC. v. NRDC
243 24lttlChevron24 needs little introduction.24 It involved judicial review of
a legislative regulation promulgated by the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"). The issue in the case was "whether [the] EPA's
decision to allow States to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices
within the same industrial grouping as though they were encased
within a single 'bubble' is based on a reasonable construction of the
statutory term 'stationary source. '245
A. Background Information
First, some background information that may have contributed to
the style of the Chevron opinion's discussion of scope of judicial
review. Chevron came to the Court based on a 1982 decision of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit concluding that the EPA's
"bubble" concept regulation could not be employed in the Clean Air
Act's nonattainment program.246  Judge Ginsburg (now Justice
Ginsburg) wrote the opinion. An important point in the case was that
239. Id. at 237 n.18.
240. The Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress, Box 397, Folder 82-1005.
241. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court. Highlights
from the Marshall Papers, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. 10606, 10613 (1993).
242. Id. (arguing that the Justices did not seem to "realize the full implications of
their landmark administrative law decision in... Chevron," based on a review of
Justice Thurgood Marshall's papers).
243. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Professor Jordan
considered Chevron to be "the classic application of Hearst." Jordan, supra note 36, at
483-86.
244. Chevron is probably the most cited administrative law case of the twentieth
century, and has been the topic of innumerable law review articles. See John F.
Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era,
64 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 35, 36 n.3 (1995). Coverdale's article lists forty-seven major
articles on Chevron; note that it does not include all the available Chevron literature.
Id.
245. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
246. NRDC v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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the panel found itself bound by 1978247 and 1979248 decisions of the
Circuit. She said, "[wie are therefore impelled by the force of our
precedent in Alabama Power and ASARCO to hold that EPA's...
employment of the bubble concept.., in nonattainment areas, is
impermissible." '249 And, she added a statement that the panel
expressed no view on the decision it would reach if these two cases did
not control its judgment.
These decisions, particularly in Alabama Power panel's
reconciliation of its holding with ASARCO... establish as the law
of this Circuit a bright line test for determining the propriety of
EPA's resort to a bubble concept. The bubble concept... is
mandatory for Clean Air Act programs designed merely to maintain
existing air quality; it is inappropriate, both ASARCO and Alabama
Power plainly signal, in programs enacted to improve the quality of
the ambient air.
Judge Ginsburg pointed out that ASARCO was written broadly and
could well be read "to imply that the bubble concept is inappropriate
to any portion of the Clean Air Act. '251 Alabama Power narrowed
ASARCO's scope by indicating that although the Act as a whole is
designed to enhance air quality, in ruling on the application vel non of
the bubble concept, the Court must look to the purpose of the Clean
Air Act program at issue.252 The Court found that "[i]n the Alabama
Power-ASARCO context, 'purpose' clearly means goal, objective.
The goal of the nonattainment program is undoubtedly to improve air
quality ....
At several points in Chevron, the Court includes remarks which
may indicate its irritation with the D.C. Circuit's performances in
ASARCO and Alabama Power. For example, in Section VI, the
Court said that in 1980 the EPA adopted a regulation that "took
particular note of the two... Court of Appeals decisions, which had
created the bright-line rule... . Relying heavily on those cases...
[the EPA's] primary legal analysis was predicated on the two Court of
Appeals decisions. "254
In Section VII, the Court said it was significant that not the Agency,
but the Court of Appeals read the Statute inflexibly. "We conclude
that it was the Court of Appeals, rather than Congress or any of the
decision-makers who are authorized by Congress to administer this
247. Asarco Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
248. Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
249. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d at 720.
250. Id. at 726.
251. Id. at 726 n.37.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 727.
254. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 857 (1984).
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legislation, that was primarily responsible for the 1980 position taken
by the agency.''
255
Further, "[jiudges are not experts in the field, and are not part of
either political branch of the Government. Courts must, in some
cases, resolve competing political interests, but not on the basis of the
judges' personal policy preferences." '256
And finally,
[w]hen a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory
provision.., really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy,
rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open
by Congress... federal judges-who have no constituency-have a
duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.
257
The relevant court of appeals opinions and the Court's Chevron
remarks about the responsibilities of judges suggest that irritation with
the D.C. Circuit influenced the style of the Court's opinion in Section
II dealing with judicial scope of review regarding agency construction
of agency-administered legislation.58 Irritation may have influenced
inclusion of the so-called "two-step" doctrine employed to introduce
section II of its opinion. The two steps stated were well-established
principles of statutory construction long before the Court wrote its
Chevron opinion.259 Accordingly, the two steps may have been meant
as nothing more than a cease and desist lecturing of the D.C. Circuit.
B. Scope of Judicial Review
In section I of its opinion, the Court said that "[t]he basic legal error
of the Court of Appeals was to adopt a static judicial definition of the
term 'stationary source' when it had decided that Congress itself had
not commanded that definition. '' 6
Section II is devoted completely to a review of "well-settled
principles" of the scope of judicial review of agency legal
determinations. It opens with the familiar two-question language
which has become known as the "two-step." The first question is
whether congressional intent is clear on the precise question at issue.
If it is, both court and agency "must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. 2 61 This question does not strike me as
innovative or revolutionary. Both the plain meaning and the
255. Id. at 864. Court irritation with the D.C. Circuit also had occurred in the late
1970s in connection with agency rulemaking. See Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking's
Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 Admin. L.
Rev. 1139, 1175-78 (2001).
256. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
257. Id. at 866.
258. Pierce et al., supra note 196, at 377; see also Jordan, supra note 36, at 485-86.
259. See infra Part III.B.
260. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
261. Id. at 843.
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legislative purpose methods of statutory interpretation purport to
seek out what the legislature intended. If the court, using either
method, determines that it has found that intent, it gives it effect. To
do otherwise would violate separation of powers principles and would
constitute judicial usurpation of the authority of another branch of
government. This proposition has been repeated in the cases for
many years.
In footnote nine, entered at the end of his statement of the first
question, Justice Stevens wrote that "[tihe judiciary is the final
authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional
intent." '262 This statement is not remarkable either. The constitutional
legitimacy of the administrative agency as an organ of government
was based, in part, on the authority of reviewing courts to make
certain that administrators neither violated legislative intent nor
exceeded the limits imposed upon them by the legislation. In the
same footnote nine, and as support for this statement, Justice Stevens
cited a group of nine Supreme Court cases (from 1896 to 1981) in
which agency interpretation of legislation had been evaluated. 263
One of the cases was Federal Maritime Commission v. Seatrain
Lines, Inc.2" The Court elaborated on the proper role of courts when
reviewing agency statutory constructions.265  In doing so, it
incorporated into its statement citations to three of the other cases
cited by Justice Stevens. The Court said:
As this Court held in a related context, "[t]he construction put on a
statute by the agency charged with administering it is entitled to
deference by the courts, and ordinarily that construction will be
affirmed if it has a reasonable basis in law .... ." But the courts are
the final authorities on issues of statutory construction and "are not
obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance of
administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory
mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a
statute.",266
Justice Stevens concluded footnote nine by indicating that if a court
ascertained congressional intention "on the precise question at issue,"
it must be given effect.267 The cases cited, and the Volkswagenwerk
case elaborating on four of them, included both agency application of
the statute questions (micromeaning deference) and fundamental,
underlying-purposes-of-the-statute questions (macromeaning
262. Id. at 843 n.9.
263. Id.
264. 411 U.S. 726 (1973).
265. Id. at 745-46.
266. Id. (citing Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261, 272
(1968)).
267. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
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independent judgment). Thus, the "precise question" could be of
either type. I do not take "precise," in this context, to mean only
agency application or micromeaning questions. In some of the cases,
a macromeaning question is quite precise. My reading of both the
language and the cases in footnote nine is that they validate the Gray-
Hearst allocation model of scope of judicial review that was in place
pre-Chevron.
The statement of the second question begins, in my judgment, with
an admonition directed to the D.C. Circuit. It is that if the court
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise issue in
question (as was true of the "bubble" concept issue here) the court
does not simply impose its own construction on the statute268 (as the
D.C. Circuit did here) if there is an agency authorized to determine
the issue initially (as was the EPA here). If "the statute is silent or
ambiguous" with respect to the specific issue (as it was here), the
question for the Court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of a statute.
The last part of the second question could be read literally to
include both micromeaning and macromeaning interpretations by an
agency as "the precise question" or as "the specific issue." If so read,
it would require courts to defer to all reasonable agency constructions
of the statute, even if at the fundamental or underlying purpose
level.269 But such a literal reading would completely conflict with the
statements and cases in footnote nine, which recognized that an
agency court shared responsibility for deciding micro and macro
questions of statutory meaning.
Section II continues with a reiteration of scope of review principles
of legislative rules required or necessary to implement a specific
portion of a statute, or legislative rules arising out of delegated
general rulemaking authority. The Court then stated it has long
recognized that considerable weight should be given to administrative
constructions of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.
Hearst is one of the cases cited.
The Court's reiteration concludes with an extensive quotation from
United States v. Shimer,27° which illustrates deference to a reasonable
administrative interpretation reconciling conflicting policies. Hearst is
among the cases cited in Shimer to support the proposition.27' The
final portion of the quotation from Shimer follows:
If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting
policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we
should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its
268. Id. at 843 ("[A]s would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation.").
269. See Braun, supra note 236, at 992-96.
270. 367 U.S. 374 (1961).
271. Id. at 382.
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legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress
would have sanctioned.272
The last paragraph of Section II of Chevron significantly says: "In
light of these well-settled principles it is clear that the Court of
Appeals misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing the
regulations at issue."273 The Court then applied the principles.
After the court of appeals determined that Congress did not
actually have an intent regarding the applicability of the bubble
concept to the permit program, the question before it was "whether
the Administrator's view that it is appropriate in the context of this
particular program is a reasonable one. '274  The Court's precise
references to the permit program and to "this particular program"
indicate it considered the question to be one of application, primarily
for the EPA to decide. Its approach would be consistent with Gray-
Hearst deference.
Why would the Court reiterate "well-settled principles" of
administrative law and say the court of appeals erred by failing to
follow them if it intended to introduce a significant change in the law
of scope of review? The style of this section of the opinion may have
been chosen to instruct the D.C. Circuit by enumerating the obvious
steps in the process of applying the "well-settled principles." It also
may have been addressed to any other circuit court, which might
entertain similar notions about the proper role of courts in this
context.275
C. The Types of Questions Presented for Review
1. Micromeaning Question
There are other portions of the Chevron opinion that support the
conclusion that the statutory interpretation question in Chevron was
one of the micromeaning of the statute. For example, the final
portion of the Court's quote from Shimer 76 indicates the issue was
272. Id. at 383.
273. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.
274. Id.
275. Judge Kenneth Starr stated that Chevron was a watershed decision. Kenneth
W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 Yale J. on Reg. 283 (1986).
Professor Pierce said that Chevron "transformed dramatically" the scope of review.
Pierce et al., supra note 196; see Jordan, supra note 36, at 456 n.8, 482-83 n.185;
Bloomberg, supra note 34, at 118 n.44. Other commentators did not perceive a
significant departure from the existing principles of scope of review. See Stephen
Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 380-
81 (1986); Byse, supra note 353, at 255; Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the
Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 Admin.
L. Rev. 803, 836 (2001).
276. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.
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one of application. At the outset of Section IV the Court pointed out
that the Clean Air Act Amendments are lengthy, detailed, and a
comprehensive response to a measure of social issue. Then it says a
small portion of the statute expressly deals with the non-attainment
areas. The Court said the focal point of the controversy is "one
phrase" in that portion of the amendments.277 In section VII under
"Legislative History," the Court stated that the legislative history is
"consistent with the view that the EPA should have broad discretion
in implementing the policies of the 1977 Amendments. 1 78 Conferring
broad discretion on a federal agency is not, however, unique to the
EPA. Many of the agencies involved in the Court's cases which
evolved the Gray-Hearst doctrine possessed broad discretion to
implement their organic legislation.
The Court indicated that the agency advanced a reasonable
explanation for its conclusion that the regulations serve both the
environmental objectives and the reasonable economic growth
objectives of the statute. 79  It added that the Administrator's
interpretation represented a reasonable accommodation of manifestly
competing interests and is entitled to deference.280 In the final
paragraph of the opinion, the Court holds that the EPA's definition of
the statutory term is a "permissible construction of the statute which
seeks to accommodate progress in reducing air pollution" while not
stifling economic growth.28' The regulations adopted provided "what
the agency could allowably view as [an] effective reconciliation" of
those two conflicting goals.282
2. Macromeaning Question
In section V of its opinion, the Court identified the fundamental,
underlying purposes of the non-attainment provisions to be the
accommodation of conflicting goals, i.e., economic growth and
improvement of air quality.283 In section VII, the Court said that
Congress intended to accommodate both economic growth and
improvement of air quality but did not do so on the level of specificity
presented in the case..21 And in the last paragraph of the opinion, the
Court again described the statute as seeking to "accommodate
progress in reducing air pollution with economic growth. '285
277. Id. at 848-49.
278. Id. at 862.
279. Id. at 863.
280. Id. at 865.
281. Id. at 866.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 851-52.
284. Id. at 865.
285. Id. at 866.
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Chevron allocates the roles of agency and court at the
micromeaning or application level of legislative interpretation. It
does not have the court abdicate its duty to "say what the law is" at
the macromeaning level. Therefore, Marbury lives!286 Even so, the
meaning of the Chevron decision has been debated since it was
announced. Part of the difficulty may be the Court's later inartful
recitations of Chevron language without identifying precisely the
functional contexts in which its language is meant to apply. Another
problem may be some of the Court's word choices which may be read
to mean that Chevron allocates authority to agencies to make
macromeaning interpretations of legislation. An example of this
confusion occurs in the Court's decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.287
III. POST-CHEVRON SCOPE OF REVIEW
This part presents a number of post-Chevron cases. First are two
sample post-Chevron cases that indicate that the Court continued to
apply the allocation model of scope of review that was in place pre-
Chevron.28 8 Others are available and could be included as well, but
these suffice to illustrate the point. Second is the Christensen289 case
that reaffirms the 1944 Skidmore29° principle of persuasive deference
review of agency executive action that does not have the force of law.
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Christensen also is included, for in it
he presented four of the Court's cases, decided after Chevron that he
contended illustrated the Court had accorded Chevron deference to
"authoritative agency positions" despite the earlier Skidmore
approach.9 I analyze them and conclude that in each of them there is
legally "something more" than a mere agency statement of its
executive opinion that served to justify the Court's decision. I also
have included two additional cases that Justice Scalia later contended
in his Mead dissent also illustrated his point.2 2 Third, the Court's
2000 tobacco regulation case is included because of its similarity to,
286. Professor Cass R. Sunstein has said that "Chevron... has become a kind of
Marbury or counter-Marbury for the administrative state." Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration After Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 2075 (1990).
287. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
288. See Bloomberg, supra note 34, at 122-29 nn.75-125. Most post-Chevron cases
follow the traditional pre-Chevron approach of Hearst. See supra notes 55-83 and
accompanying text. The search for congressional intent must center on both the
specific statutory language and the statute as a whole. But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
The Supreme Court's New Hyptertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and
Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 749 (1995) (criticizing the
Court for its inconsistency in applying its announced principles of deference); Sidney
A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive
Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 Duke L.J. 1051, 1070-71 (1995).
289. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
290. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
291. See infra Part III.B.
292. See infra Part III.D.
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and its consistency with, the 1944 Packard case. 293 The final case in
this part is United States v. Mead, which clarifies Chevron, and, in my
judgment, reaffirms the pre-Chevron allocation model of Gray-
Hearst.
294
A. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca295 involved an INS adjudicative action in
which the agency refused to grant either relief from deportation or
asylum to an alien who contended that if she were returned to her
home country she would be in physical danger. The Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1980, as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980,
contained two provisions that were relevant to the alien's case. In one
provision, the Act provided for relief from deportation, based on a
standard of clear probability of persecution.296 In another section, the
Act provided for a discretionary grant of asylum by the Attorney
General, based on a standard of "well-founded fear of persecution.
297
The issue in the case was whether the standards used in applying these
two provisions were the same or different. The INS contended they
were the same and applied a single standard in the administrative
hearing and in the administrative review proceeding to both types of
relief.
The court of appeals determined that the standards were different,
that the issue was one of statutory construction for the court, the
congressional intent was clear, and thus, no deference was due the
INS interpretation. The Supreme Court agreed and attempted to
explain how Chevron played out in this situation. Justice Stevens,
writing for the Court, said:
The question whether Congress intended the two standards to be
identical is a pure question of statutory construction for the courts to
decide. Employing traditional tools of statutory construction, we
have concluded that Congress did not intend the two standards to be
identical .... The narrow legal question whether the two standards
are the same is, of course, quite different from the question of
interpretation that arises in each case in which the agency is required
to apply either or both standards to a particular set of facts .... In
that process of filling "'any gap left, implicitly or explicitly by
Congress,"' the Courts must respect the interpretation of the agency
to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for administering
the statutory program .... But our task today is much narrower and
is well within the province of the Judiciary ... 298
293. See infra Part III.E.
294. See infra Part III.F.
295. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
296. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2000).
297. Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000).
298. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446-48 (internal citations omitted).
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The phrase, "pure question of statutory construction," is
reminiscent of Justice Jackson's "naked question of law" phrase in
Packard, where the Court's task was to reconcile the meaning of the
terms "employee" and "employer" in the NLRA.2 99 The Court's
independent interpretation of the clear meaning, the underlying
purposes of the NLRA, controlled the answer to the interstitial,
micromeaning question.
Similarly, the Court's task in Cardoza-Fonseca was to reconcile the
two legislative standards and determine, independently, whether they
were the same for purposes of agency application. In both cases the
''pure question" to be decided independently by the Court was at the
macromeaning level of the legislation. In its concluding statement,
the Court said:
Whether or not a "refugee" is eventually granted asylum is a matter
which Congress has left for the Attorney General to decide. But it is
clear that Congress did not intend to restrict eligibility for that relief
to those who could prove that it is more likely than not that they will
be persecuted if deported.3 °
B. Rust v. Sullivan
In 1970, Congress enacted Title X of the Public Service Health Act.
Section 1008 of the Act provides that "none of the funds appropriated
under this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a
method of family planning. 1301
Rust v. Sullivan involved events in 1988, when "the Secretary
promulgated new regulations designed to provide 'clear and
operational guidance' to grantees about how to preserve the
distinction between Title X funded programs and abortion as a
method of family planning. '' 3°2  The regulations imposed three
principal conditions on Title X funds: (1) they forbade counseling
concerning abortion as a method of family planning or referral for
abortion as a method of family planning; (2) they barred lobbying for
legislation to increase the availability of abortion; prohibited
developing or disseminating material advocating abortion; prohibited
pro-abortion speakers; barred using legal action to make abortion
available; and forbade paying dues to any group that advocates
abortion; and (3) they required that Title X projects must be
organized to be physically and financially separate from prohibited
abortion activities.
299. Packard Motor Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485,486 (1947).
300. Id. at 450.
301. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (2000).
302. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 179 (1991).
1146 [Vol. 73
BURSTING THE CHEVRON BUBBLE
The regulations were challenged by doctors and grantees as not
authorized by Title X and in violation of their First and Fifth
Amendment rights.
As for the fundamental, underlying purposes of the Act, the Court
said:
The Secretary based the need for the separation requirements
"squarely on the congressional intent that abortion not be a part of a
Title X funded program".... Indeed, if one thing is clear from the
legislative history, it is that Congress intended that Title X funds be
kept separate and distinct from abortion-related activities. It is
undisputed that Title X was intended to provide primarily pre-
pregnancy preventive services. °
As for the Act's interstitial meaning in terms of the limitation
expressed in § 1008, the Court held the language of § 1008 to be
ambiguous:
At no time did Congress directly address the issues of abortion
counseling, referral, or advocacy .... When we find, as we do here,
that the legislative history is ambiguous and unenlightening on the
matters with respect to which the regulations deal, we customarily
defer to the expertise of the agency.3°a-
Therefore, in Rust v. Sullivan, the Court: (1) "said what the law is"
by declaring the fundamental, underlying meaning of the Act, (2)
found there was no clear congressional intent on the interstitial issue
of how the § 1008 prohibition was to be implemented, and (3)
accordingly, deferred to the Secretary's reasonable interpretation of §
1008 in the regulations. Perceived in this manner, the Court's
approach is quite consistent with Chevron and Cardoza-Fonseca. It
also is consistent with Gray-Hearst.
C. Christensen v. Harris County
3 5
This recent case is probably well known to most readers.3 6 Briefly,
the question was whether, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, states and their political subdivisions may require employees to
schedule time off from work to reduce the amount of their accrued
compensatory time. Harris County, Texas, implemented such a plan
to avoid paying cash compensation to employees who did not use their
accumulated time. County deputy sheriffs sued, claiming that the
FLSA does not permit an employer to compel an employee to use
303. Id. at 190.
304. Id. at 185-86.
305. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
306. Sixteen years after Chevron was decided, this case began the court's recently
introduced process of clarifying its meaning in light of the variety of interpretations it
had been given by lower courts and commentators.
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compensatory time in the absence of an agreement permitting the
employer to do so.
The complainants' point was supported by an opinion letter from
the Acting Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the
Department of Labor. The letter stated the Administrator's position
to be that a public employer may schedule compensatory time as
directed, if there is a prior agreement specifically providing for it.
Absent such an agreement, the Administrator's position was that
"neither the statute nor the regulations permit an employer to require
an employee to use accrued compensatory time."3"7
1. The Court's Opinion
The Court held that nothing in the FLSA or its implementing
regulation prohibits a public employer from compelling the use of
compensatory time. In so holding, the Court rejected the contention
that it should defer to the Department of Labor's opinion letter on the
basis of Chevron:
Interpretations such as those in opinion letters-like interpretations
contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law-do not warrant
Chevron-style deference ... . Instead, interpretations contained in
formats such as opinion letters are "entitled to respect" under our
decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co... but only to the extent that
those interpretations have the "power to persuade"... 308
Thus began the process of resurrecting the Skidmore prong of the
well-established pre-Chevron principles of scope of judicial review.
2. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion-Authoritative Agency
Position
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia objected to the Court's
refusal to give effect to "the position""3 9 of the Department of Labor
in its opinion letter, because it
is entitled only to so-called "Skidmore deference,".... Skidmore
deference to authoritative agency views is an anachronism, dating
from an era in which we declined to give agency interpretations
(including interpretive regulations, as opposed to 'legislative rules')
307. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 581 (quoting Op. Ltr. Dept. of Labor, Wage & Hour
Div. (Sept. 14, 1992), available at 1992 WL 845100).
308. Id. at 587 (internal citations omitted). Professor Robert Anthony states that in
Christensen the Court takes an "eminently sound position." Robert A. Anthony,
Three Settings in Which Nonlegislative Rules Should Not Bind, 53 Admin. L. Rev.
1313, 1314-16 (2001).
309. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 589 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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authoritative effect. That era came to an end with our watershed
decision in Chevron.
310
He continued: "Quite appropriately, therefore, we have accorded
Chevron deference not only to agency regulations, but to authoritative
agency positions set forth in a variety of other formats." '' He
followed with what he considered to be illustrations of those "other
formats." This was, apparently, to support his belief that "the
position" '3 12 of the Department of Labor that the County's action was
unlawful unless permitted by the terms of an agreement "warrants
Chevron deference if it represents the authoritative view of the
Department of Labor." '313 Those illustrations deserve review and
evaluation.
Illustration 1: INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre3 14 is, of course, quite
acceptable for Aguirre-Aguirre was a formal adjudication, based on
delegated authority and having the force of law. Chevron deference
to formal adjudicatory decisions, as well as legislative rules, was
established in Cardoza-Fonseca."5
Illustration 2: NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life
Insurance Co. 3 1 6 involved application, pursuant to a Comptroller's
regulation for permission to serve as an agent in the sale of
annuities.3 17 The Comptroller granted that permission and authorized
the bank to broker annuities. The Court restated the familiar
Chevron procedure and said: "If the administrator's reading fills a
gap or defines a term in a way that is reasonable in light of the
legislature's revealed design, we give the administrator's judgment
'controlling weight.' ' 318
However, there is more to the Comptroller's action than it being
simply an administrator's reading to which the court gave Chevron
deference. The suit by Variable challenging the Comptroller's
decision sought declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the APA
and sections of the U.S. Code.319 Licensing is defined as an "agency
process respecting the grant... of a license" . . . in section 551(9) of
the APA.32 ° Section 551(8) defines "license" to include "the whole or
a part of an agency permit.., approval.., or other form of
310. Id.
311. Id. at 590.
312. Id. at 591.
313. Id.
314. 526 U.S. 415 (1999) (adjudication).
315. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
316. NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co, 513 U.S. 251
(1995) (letter of Comptroller of the Currency).
317. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 (1994).
318. Id. at 270 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
319. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (2000).
320. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
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permission." '321 Section 551(6) defines "order" to mean "the whole or
a part of a final disposition... of an agency in a matter other than rule
making but including licensing." '322 Section 551(7) defines
"adjudication" to mean agency process for the formulation of an
order. "323
Thus, the Comptroller actually granted NationsBank a license to
broker annuities. It was a final agency action and had the force of
law. That is, should the Comptroller have second thoughts and decide
to withdraw, suspend, revoke, or cancel the license, he would be
required to follow procedures under section 558(c) of the APA324 to
do so. The procedure would have to meet due process standards as
well.
Therefore, Chevron deference was properly accorded the
Comptroller's decision in the format of a licensing action as an
informal adjudication. Notice of the action was conveyed by letter,
but deference was not because it was in the format of a "letter of
Comptroller of the Currency."
Illustration 3: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp.3"
involved PBGC, a government corporation that administers and
enforces Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 ("ERISA").2 6 Title IV includes a mandatory government
insurance program that protects the pension benefits of more than
thirty million private sector workers who participate in plans covered
by Title IV. When a Title IV plan terminates with insufficient assets
to satisfy its pension obligations to the employees, PBGC becomes
trustee of the plan and uses its assets to cover what it can of the
benefit obligations. PBGC then adds its own funds to insure payment
of most of the remaining benefits. Plans may be terminated
voluntarily by an employer or involuntarily by PBGC. PBGC also has
authority to restore the plan to its pre-termination status.
LTV filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code with its Title IV plans dramatically underfunded. Accordingly,
PBGC acted to terminate the plans to protect its insurance program
from unreasonable risk of losses. LTV then created new pension
agreements to which PBGC objected as an arrangement designed to
wrap around the PBGC insurance benefits to provide both retirees
and active participants the same benefits they would have received
had no termination occurred.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c).
325. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990) (decision by
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. ("PBGC") to restore a pension benefit plan).
326. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), Pub. L. No.
93-406, tit. IV, 88 Stat. 1028 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1347 (2000)).
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Later, anticipating a dramatic turnaround in the steel industry and
LTV's fortunes, PBGC's Director issued a Notice of Restoration to
LTV indicating PBGC's intention to restore the terminated plans.
That meant the plans would be ongoing, and that LTV again would be
responsible for administering and funding them. LTV refused to
comply with the restoration decision. PBGC instituted enforcement
action in federal court.
The district court vacated the PBGC restoration order as exceeding
its authority. The court of appeals held, inter alia, that the agency's
restoration order was arbitrary and capricious under the APA because
PBGC's informal adjudication decision process lacked adequate
procedural protections. The Supreme Court granted certiorari."'
PBGC argued that in holding its restoration decision arbitrary and
capricious, "the Court of Appeals departed from traditional principles
of statutory interpretation and judicial review of agency construction
of statutes. 3 28 The Court agreed with PBGC, introduced the Chevron
formula, applied it, and concluded the agency action should be given
deference.
On the matter of the court of appeals ruling that the agency
procedures were inadequate in the case, the Court discussed both
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC329 and Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe33° to evaluate the informal
adjudication process by which the restoration decision was made. The
Court pointed out that "[h]ere, unlike in Overton Park, the Court of
Appeals did not suggest that the administrative record was inadequate
to enable the court to fulfill its duties under [APA] § 706." 33'
The Court held no provision in ERISA or the APA gave LTV the
procedural rights it identified as necessary. Thus the court of appeals
holding "ran afoul" of both Vermont Yankee and Overton Park. In
conclusion, the Court said:
The determination in this case, however, was lawfully made by
informal adjudication, the minimal requirements for which are set
forth in [§ 555] of the APA,... and do not include such elements [as
those identified by LTV]. A failure to provide them where the Due
Process Clause itself does not require them (which has not been
asserted here) is therefore not unlawful .... Finally, we find the
327. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 496 U.S. at 644.
328. Id. at 647.
329. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978)
("[C]ourts are not free to impose upon agencies specific procedural requirements that
have no basis in the APA.")
330. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 496 U.S. at 655-56 (citing Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-21 (1971)). "[M]andating that an
agency take whatever steps it needs to provide an explanation that will enable the
court to evaluate the agency's rationale at the time of decision." Id. at 654.
331. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
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procedures employed by the PBGC to be consistent with the
APA.332
The PBGC restoration order is more accurately described as in the
format of an informal adjudication under the APA, rather than as a
"decision by PBGC to restore [the] pension benefit plan. 333
Illustration 4: Young v. Community Nutrition Institute.334  The
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") provides that when the
addition of any poisonous or deleterious substance to food is required
in the production thereof or cannot be avoided by good manufactory
practice, the Secretary of Health and Human Services "shall
promulgate regulations limiting the quantity therein or thereon to
such extent as he finds necessary for the protection of public
health."335
Rather than setting a "tolerance level" (legislative regulation) for
aflatoxin, a potent carcinogen that is invariably present in some foods,
the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") announced an action
level of twenty parts per billion. An action level assures food
processors that the FDA ordinarily will not enforce the Act's general
adulteration provisions against them if the quantity of the harmful
substance is less than the action level.
The central question in the case concerned construction of the § 346
provision, "the Secretary shall promulgate regulations. 3 36 Since the
enactment of the Act in 1938, the FDA consistently had interpreted it
to give it the discretion to decide whether to promulgate a § 346
regulation, known in the administrative vernacular as a "tolerance
level." The regulations are promulgated through a process similar to
formal evidentiary rulemaking. On occasion, the FDA sets "action
levels" through a less formal process, apparently not pursuant to § 553
of the APA rulemaking procedures.
In 1980, the FDA published a notice in the Federal Register to the
effect that it "will not recommend regulatory action for violation '37 of
the Act with respect to interstate shipment of corn from the 1980 crop
harvested in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia "which
contains no more than 100 ppb aflatoxin ' '3 ' and provided such corn
was to be used only as feed for mature, non-lactating livestock, and
mature poultry. This Federal Register exemption notice prompted
332. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 496 U.S. at 655-56.
333. 29 U.S.C. § 4047.
334. Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986) (stating that the Food and
Drug Administration's "longstanding interpretation of the statute" was reflected in a
no-action notice published in the Federal Register).
335. 21 U.S.C. § 346 (2000).
336. Young, 476 U.S. at 977.
337. Id. at 978 (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 7448 (Jan. 23, 1981).
338. Id.
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two public interest groups and a consumer to sue the Commissioner of
the FDA in federal court.
They alleged (1) that the Act requires the FDA to set a "tolerance
level" for aflatoxin before allowing food containing it to be shipped in
interstate commerce; (2) that the FDA had employed insufficient
procedures to set its aflatoxin "action level" even if a "tolerance level"
was not required; and (3) that the FDA's decision to grant the 1980
exemption from the "action level" independently violated the Act and
the FDA's own regulations.33 9 The district court deferred to the
FDA's interpretation of § 346 and ruled a "tolerance level" was not
required prior to interstate shipment of aflatoxin-tainted corn in
interstate commerce. The court of appeals reversed the district
court's conclusion as to the proper interpretation of § 346 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Significantly, the court of appeals had considered none of the other
issues before the district court. Therefore, only the § 346 issue was
before the Supreme Court. Its analysis began with Chevron. Finding
the statutory language ambiguous, and interpreted consistently by the
FDA for forty-eight years, it said: "This view of the agency charged
with administering the statute is entitled to considerable
deference.... We find the FDA's interpretation of § 346 to be
sufficiently rational to preclude a court from substituting its judgment
for that of the FDA., 34
0
To this point the case appears indeed to illustrate Chevron
deference in a format of the FDA's longstanding interpretation of §
346. However, the only action the agency took to prompt the
lawsuit was to publish its no-action notice. What it did was assert its
enforcement authority discretion and announce its decision to
decline to pursue enforcement in a specific situation.
The broad enforcement discretion granted to the FDA by Congress
was elaborated in Heckler v. Chaney. 41 The Court said there: "An
agency generally cannot act against each technical violation of the
statute it is charged with enforcing .... For good reasons, such a
decision has been 'committed to agency discretion,' and we believe
that the Congress enacting the APA did not intend to alter that
tradition. 3 42  The complainants initially challenged the FDA's
decision to grant the exemption as violating the Act and its own
regulations. But the court of appeals did not consider the issue and it
did not come before the Court.
Despite the fact that the Court's decision is, therefore, technically
limited to construction of a statutory provision, the agency no-action
339. Id. (quoting Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985)).
340. Id. at 981 (internal citations omitted).
341. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
342. Id. at 831-32.
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decision and its announcement in the Federal Register, generated the
case. This seems quite different from a case said to illustrate Chevron
deference to a "longstanding interpretation of the statute." Chevron
deference was appropriate because the agency action was an
authoritative, final decision not to enforce the FDCA in a specific
situation, and it also may have been judicially unreviewable under
Heckler v. Chaney.
From my perspective, these four cases do not support the
proposition that a reasonable, authoritative agency position, without
more, warrants Chevron deference. If persuasive, however, it may
warrant Skidmore deference (or now Skidmore-Christensen
deference).
In each of the cases there was something more. Aguirre-Aguirre
was a formal adjudication having the force of law. NationsBank was
an informal licensing adjudication having the force of law. Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp. clearly was an informal adjudication having
the force of law. Young was an agency enforcement policy decision
having the force of law under Heckler v. Chaney. In each case the
agency acted reasonably on the basis of delegated authority, and its
action had the force of law. Thus, Chevron deference was
appropriate. Two additional cases should be included in this review
and evaluation of "authoritative agency positions" said to have been
given Chevron deference. They are both discussed below. Justice
Scalia later included them in his extensive dissent in United States v.
Mead Corp.343 as other illustrations of the proposition.
D. Two Additional Authoritative Agency Position Cases
1. Mead Corp. v. Tilley3"
Prior to 1974, many employees' rights to earned benefits under
private retirement plans were frustrated. This situation resulted from
back-loaded accrual schedules and abrupt plan terminations by
employers. To prevent such action from further depriving employees
with long years of service of their anticipated retirement benefits,
Congress enacted ERISA. 45 The Act imposes controls on funding
and termination of private retirement plans and establishes a system
of insurance for benefits provided by such plans. It is administered by
the PBGC within the Department of Labor.
This case deals with the question of whether, upon termination of a
defined benefit plan, § 4044(a) of Title IV of the Act requires a plan
administrator to pay plan participants unreduced early retirement
343. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
344. Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714 (1989).
345. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
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benefits provided under the plan before residual assets may revert to
an employer.3 46 Title IV covers the termination of private pension
plans and establishes a system of insurance for benefits provided by
such plans.3 47  Titles I and II provide requirements for plan
participation, benefit accrual, and vesting and plan funding. Title III
contains general administrative provisions.348
Title IV requires that plan assets be distributed, upon termination,
in accord with a six-tier allocation scheme set forth in § 4044(a). It
also provides that if funds remain after "all liabilities of the plan to
participants and their beneficiaries have been satisfied,' 3 49 they may
revert to the employer.
In 1983, Mead terminated its retirement plan. It paid individual
early retirement benefits only to those employees who had met both
the age and years of service requirement under Article V of its plan.
Article V required thirty or more years of service and retirement after
age sixty-two. The complainants were five employees, four of whom
had more than thirty years of service and a fifth who had twenty-eight
years of service. None had reached age sixty-two. Each received the
present value of the normal age sixty-five retirement benefit. Had
Mead paid the present value of the unreduced early retirement
benefits, each would have received an average of $9000 more. In their
legal action, complainants contended Mead violated ERISA by failing
to pay them the present value of the unreduced early retirement
benefits and then recouping approximately $11 million after the
distribution of assets was completed.
The district court ruled in favor of Mead, concluding that "'the
Plan's language, the legislative history, and the case law in the
[F]ourth [C]ircuit ... clearly demonstrate that early retirement
benefits are not 'accrued benefits' under ERISA."'3 0 The court of
appeals, however, reversed, holding that before plan assets may revert
to an employer, the sixth category of the statutory allocation scheme
requires payment of early retirement benefits to plan participants
"'even if those benefits were not accrued at the time of
termination.' "351
Before the Supreme Court, complainants conceded that, at the time
the plan was terminated, they had not satisfied both the age and
service requirements for unreduced early retirement benefits.
Nevertheless, they claimed entitlement to such benefits on the ground
that contingent early retirement benefits, even if not accrued, are
346. Tilley, 490 U.S. at 717.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d)(1)(A).
350. Tilley, 490 U.S. at 720-21 (internal citations omitted).
351. Id. at 721.
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"benefits under the plan" 352 and therefore must be distributed before
the employer can recoup any residual plan assets.
The Court noted, "preliminarily, 3 53 that PBGC had rejected the
complainants' argument. It viewed § 4044(a)(6) as not creating
additional retirement benefits, but merely providing for the orderly
distribution of benefits already earned under the plan. The PBGC
view consistently had been expressed in its Opinion Letters on plan
terminations. The Department of Labor and the IRS agreed with
PBGC that § 4044(a)(6) was limited to benefits created elsewhere.354
The Court then applied the Chevron principles, beginning with
whether there was clear congressional intent on the precise question
at issue."' First, the language of the statute:
Section 4044(a) in no way indicates an intent to confer a right upon
plan participants to recover unaccrued benefits. On the contrary,
the language... "benefits under the plan" can refer only to the
allocation of benefits provided by the terms of the terminated plan.
The limited function of § 4044(a) as an allocation mechanism is
made clear by its introductory language .... Finally, any possible
ambiguity is resolved against... [complainants] by the title of §
4044(a)-"[allocation of assets. 356
Neither did the structure of the statute provide any support for the
complainants' view: "Title IV, which contains § 4044(a), simply
provides insurance for benefits created elsewhere. It is inconceivable
[that] the section was designed to modify the carefully crafted
provisions of Title I.'357
As for the legislative history, the complainants contended
"Congress' failure to include in category 6 the word 'accrued,' ...
evinces an intent to require the provision of unaccrued as well as
accrued benefits. ' '351 The Court disagreed, saying "[t]here is simply
nothing in the legislative history suggesting that Congress intended §
4044(a) to be a source of benefit entitlements rather than an
allocation scheme. Neither the House nor the Senate bill provided for
allocation of assets on plan termination to benefits that were not
created elsewhere. 3 59 Although it referred, "preliminarily," to the
PBGC's views, the Court's decision is reached at so-called Chevron
step one. It found clear congressional intent on the issue. There was
no reason to defer to the views of the agency under Chevron.
352. 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(6).
353. Tilley, 490 U.S. at 722.
354. Id.
355. This case was cited by the Court in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV
Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 648 (1990), as "applying Chevron principles to the PBGC's
construction of ERISA."
356. Tilley, 490 U.S. at 722-23.
357. Id. at 723.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 723-24.
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Complainants made an alternative statutory argument, as well.
Because all accrued benefits vest upon plan termination pursuant to
another section of ERISA,36 they are nonforfeitable benefits which
are within category 5 of the allocation scheme. The Court pointed out
that PBGC had consistently maintained that for purposes of
guarantee and asset allocation under section 4044(a) whether benefits
are "forfeitable or nonforfeitable depends upon their status before
plan termination."36'
The Court continued:
[Complainants] have failed to persuade us that the PBGC's views
are unreasonable. On the contrary, it is... [complainants']
interpretation which cannot be squared with the statute. For if
category 5 included benefits that were forfeitable before plan
termination as well as those that were nonforfeitable, there would
be no guarantee that nonforfeitable benefits would be paid before
forfeitable benefits in cases where plan assets are insufficient to
cover both. This result would contravene the clear directive of the
allocation scheme to give priority to nonforfeitable benefits. 3 62
Thus, the agency position actually was stated in its regulations3 63
and not merely in opinion letters, guidelines, etc., that would lack the
force of law. Further, the Court appears to say that, in any event, the
agency position was consistent with the clear directive of the
allocation provision of the statute, in contrast to the position of the
complainants. Chevron deference is irrelevant because congressional
intent is clear on the specific issue.
Because the court of appeals relied exclusively on § 4044(a)(6) as
the basis for deciding in favor of the complainants, the Court reversed
its judgment. The lower court had not considered two alternative
grounds concluding that ERISA requires payment of unreduced early
retirement benefits before surplus assets revert to the employer:
"[F]irst, unreduced early retirement benefits may qualify as 'accrued
benefits' under ERISA; and, second, unreduced early retirement
benefits may be 'liabilities' within the meaning of § 4044(d)(1)(A)." 3
Accordingly, the Court remanded
for a determination whether [complainants] are entitled to damages
on the basis of either of these alternative theories. In deciding these
issues, the Court of Appeals should consider the views of the PBGC
and the IRS. For a court to attempt to answer these questions
360. 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(6) (2000).
361. Tilley, 490 U.S. at 725 (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 2613.6(b), 2618.2 (1987) ("Benefits
that become nonforfeitable solely as a result of the termination of a plan [are]
considered forfeitable.")).
362. Id.
363. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2613.6(b), 2618.2.
364. Tilley, 490 U.S. at 726.
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without the views of the agencies responsible for enforcing ERISA,
would be to "embark[] upon a voyage without a compass. 365
In its footnote eleven, the Court stated that although the parties
and several amici curiae had discussed these alternative theories, the
PBGC and the IRS had not. The PBGC brief stated it expressed no
view on the question
"arising under Titles I and II of ERISA, whether early retirement
benefits are accrued benefits". . . . The PBGC brief does not
mention the § 4044(d)(1)(A) liabilities issue .... Without the views
of the agencies responsible for enforcing ERISA or an opinion by
the Court of Appeals, we are reluctant to address these complicated
and important issues pertaining to the private pensions of millions of
workers.366
Hence, the Court's disposition of the case avoided deciding a major
question until the "views" of PBGC and the IRS could be considered
by the court of appeals on the remand. Of course, no deference was
accorded to agency views not yet known.
In dissent, Justice Stevens said: "Perhaps the Court is prudent to
await the advice of the Solicitor General before deciding the principal
question presented by this case." '36 7 But he was persuaded the benefits
the complainants sought were contingent liabilities that must be paid
before surplus assets revert to the employer.
2. FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp.
FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp.3" decided the question of whether
a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note is
insured as a "deposit" under the federal deposit insurance program.
Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority and, at the outset, said:
We hold that, in light of the longstanding interpretation of... [the]
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) that such a letter
does not create a deposit and, in light of the fact that such letter
does not entrust any noncontingent assets to the bank.. .[it] does
not give rise to an insured deposit. 369
The Penn Square Bank issued the standby letter of credit in the
amount of $145,000 for the benefit of Philadelphia Gear. The Court
explained: "Because the letter of credit was intended to provide
payment to the seller only if the buyer of the invoiced goods failed to
make payment, the letter of credit was what is commonly referred to
as a 'standby' or 'guaranty' letter of credit.""37 It is distinguished from
365. Id. (quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555,568 (1980)).
366. Id. at 726-27 & n.11.
367. Id. at 727.
368. 476 U.S. 426 (1986).
369. Id. at 427.
370. Id. at 428.
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a conventional letter of credit, where the seller obtains payment from
the issuing bank without looking to the buyer for payment.
Later, Penn Square was declared insolvent, and the FDIC was
appointed as its receiver. Shortly thereafter, Philadelphia Gear
presented drafts on the standby letter of credit for payment of goods
delivered before Penn Square's insolvency. The FDIC returned the
drafts unpaid. Philadelphia Gear sued the FDIC, alleging that the
standby letter of credit was an insured deposit and that it was,
therefore, entitled to $100,000 in deposit insurance from the FDIC.
The district court held that the letter was an insured deposit on which
the FDIC was liable for $100,000. The court of appeals affirmed the
district court decision on this issue. The Supreme Court granted
review and reversed.
The FDIC argued that it had consistently interpreted this section of
the Act not to include standby letters of credit backed only by a
contingent promissory note. The interpretation was based on the fact
that the note does not represent hard assets, thus the alleged deposit
consists only of a contingent liability and does not give rise to a
"deposit" that Congress intended the FDIC to insure.
The Court said that:
The FDIC's interpretation.., is consistent with Congress' desire to
protect the hard earnings of individuals by providing for federal
deposit insurance. Since the creation of the FDIC, Congress has
expressed no dissatisfaction with the FDIC's interpretation of
"deposit"; indeed, Congress in 1960 adopted the FDIC's regulatory
definition as the statutory language. When we weigh all these
factors together, we are constrained to conclude that the term
"deposit" does not include a standby letter of credit backed by a
contingent promissory note.37'
Continuing, the Court discussed "the genesis of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act... for the light it shed on Congress' purpose in passing
the Act."37 The Court considered that its
purpose... was clear. Faced with virtual panic, Congress attempted
to safeguard the hard earnings of individuals against the possibility
that bank failure would deprive them of their savings .... The focus
of Congress was therefore upon ensuring that a deposit of "hard
earnings" entrusted by individuals to a bank would not lead to a
tangible loss in the event of a bank failure. 373
And, "[t]his purpose is not furthered by extending deposit
insurance to cover a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent
371. Id. at 431-32.
372. Id. at 432.
373. Id. at 432-33.
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promissory note which includes no such surrender of assets or hard
earnings to the custody of the bank." '374
Finally,
[a]t no point did Congress disown its initial, clear desire to protect
the hard assets of depositors. At no point did Congress criticize the
FDIC's longstanding interpretation .... In fact, Congress had
reenacted the 1935 provisions in 1950 without changing the
definition of 'deposit' at all .... When the statute giving rise to the
longstanding interpretation has been reenacted without pertinent
change, the "congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency's
interpretation is persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the
one intended by Congress." Indeed, the current statutory definition
of "deposit," added by Congress in 1960, was expressly designed to
incorporate the FDIC's rules and regulations on "deposits"....
Congress, therefore, has expressly incorporated into the statutory
scheme the regulations that the FDIC devised to assist it in
determining what constitutes a "deposit" within the statutory
scheme. Under these circumstances, we must obviously give a great
deal of deference to the FDIC's interpretation of what these
regulations do and do not include within their definition of
"deposit." 375
The Court made extensive references to clear congressional intent
on the macromeaning of the Act and Congress's reenactment of the
relevant provision without change to the agency's "longstanding
interpretation." That failure to revise or repeal the interpretation "is
persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by
Congress." '3 76 Therefore, the agency interpretation had been adopted
as the clear intent of Congress on the specific issue, and deference to
the FDIC interpretation had become irrelevant. It is a decision at the
Chevron so-called first step.
If, however, deference of some sort must be given the FDIC's
interpretation of its own regulation, which has been incorporated into
the statute, it should be Seminole Rock3 77 deference and not Chevron
deference.
At the end of its opinion, the Court restates its belief that,
"whatever the relevant State's definition of 'letter of credit' or
'promissory note,' Congress did not by using those phrases... intend
to protect with deposit insurance a standby letter of credit backed
only by a contingent promissory note. ' 378  If, therefore, the
congressional intent is clear on the issue, the court is actually saying
374. Id. at 435.
375. Id. at 437-38 (citations omitted).
376. Id.
377. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945); see also
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 510-14 (1994); Lyng v. Payne, 476
U.S. 926, 939 (1986); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965).
378. Philadelphia Gear, 476 U.S. at 440.
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the agency decision is correct as a matter of law because it is
consistent with clear congressional intent. Again, Chevron deference
to the agency interpretation is irrelevant because the FDIC "got it
right" at the Chevron first step.
As in the four cases from Christensen, there also was something
legally more than an authoritative agency position in these cases. In
Mead, the Court's decision was based on the clear congressional intent
identified. It said "it is... [complainant's] interpretation which
cannot be squared with the statute." '379 The agency position actually
was stated in its regulations, which had the force of law, and not
merely in opinion letters, guidelines, etc. On the remaining questions
of liability, the Court decided to await the views of the PBGC and the
IRS following the remand. In FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp. the
Court referred to the clear congressional intent on the macromeaning
of the Act and congressional adoption of the agency interpretation as
the clear intent of Congress on the specific issue.38  Where
congressional intent is found, deference is irrelevant.
E. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.381
This case repeats an earlier type of application of the allocation
model of scope of judicial review. In Packard, the Justices agreed that
the issue before the Court was the fundamental, underlying meaning
of the National Labor Relations Act. As such, it was a question for
independent determination by the Court. The disagreement among
the members of the Court was about that fundamental, underlying
meaning regarding the right of foremen to organize.382
In this case, the FDA promulgated regulations regulating tobacco
products, which were challenged by the industry. The Court majority
found that Congress had directly spoken to the issue and precluded
FDA jurisdiction: "[W]e believe that Congress has clearly precluded
the FDA from asserting jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products."3 83
It would be "inconsistent with the intent that Congress has expressed
in the FDCA's overall regulatory scheme and in the tobacco-specific
legislation that it has enacted subsequent to the FDCA.'3 84
Toward the end of its opinion, the majority said: "Deference under
Chevron... is premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity
constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill
in the statutory gaps .... In extraordinary cases, however, there may
379. Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 725 (1989).
380. Philadelphia Gear, 476 U.S. at 431-34, 437,439.
381. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
382. Packard Motor Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485,485-86 (1947).
383. FDA, 529 U.S. at 126.
384. Id.
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be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended
such an implicit delegation .... 385
The Court then referred to a statement by Justice Breyer in a 1986
article, in which he said: "A court may also ask whether the legal
question is an important one. Congress is more likely to have focused
upon, and answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters
to answer themselves in the course of the statute's daily
administration. "386
That is the central principle of the allocation model and its
accommodation of a court's Marbury authority to "say what the law
is" at the fundamental, underlying purpose level of a statute. Courts
defer to reasonable agency determinations of "interstitial matters,"
and have done so since Gray, Hearst, and Chevron. Here the meaning
of the statute was thought to be clear (at the macromeaning level) that
Congress had not given the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products.
The dissent by Justice Breyer stated that "the statute's basic
purpose-the protection of public health-supports the inclusion of
cigarettes within its scope." '387 And "[t]he statute's language, then,
permits the agency to choose remedies consistent with its basic
purpose-the overall protection of public health."38 8 On at least three
more occasions, Justice Breyer restated his view that the fundamental,
underlying purpose of the statute was to protect public health.
Therefore, all the Justices, as in Packard, indicate the issue to be the
fundamental, underlying purpose of the FDCA. As in Packard, they
disagree about what it is. The Chevron model is consistent with Gray-
Hearst in this application, for it also recognizes that if the issue is at
the fundamental level of meaning, deference is irrelevant. The
reviewing court decides the question independently. Here, the
majority believed the specific issue to be fundamental, that Congress
had addressed it directly, and that it had denied jurisdiction to the
FDA to regulate tobacco products as currently marketed. From the
majority's view, there was no impropriety in refusing to defer to the
FDA. It simply performed its Marbury duty to "say what the law is."
F. United States v. Mead Corp.389
Technically, this case concerned a tariff classification ruling, i.e., "a
written statement.., that interprets and applies the provisions of the
Customs and related laws to a specific set of facts."390 The Court said
classification rulings "are best treated like 'interpretations contained
385. Id. at 159 (citations omitted).
386. Id. (citing Breyer, supra note 275, at 370).
387. Id. at 162.
388. Id. at 178.
389. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
390. Id. at 222 n.1 (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 177.1(d)(1) (2001)).
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in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines.'
They are beyond the Chevron pale. 391
However, the Court also said: "We granted certiorari in order to
consider the limits of Chevron deference owed to administrative
practice in applying a statute."3" Then it stated the principles of its
holding. First, an administrative implementation of a statutory
provision qualifies for Chevron deference when Congress has
delegated authority to the agency to make rules having the force of
law or by delegation of power to engage in adjudication "and... the
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority. '393 This "[d]elegation of such authority may
be shown ... by some other indication of a comparable congressional
intent." '394 Second, if the implementation fails to qualify, it may,
nevertheless, "claim respect according to its persuasiveness ' 395 under
the principles of Skidmore. Skidmore also applies where there is
delegated authority to make rules but "where such authority was not
invoked.'396 This model also is consistent with Gray-Hearst, if not a
restatement of Gray-Hearst.
The Court's inclusion of "or by some other indication of a
comparable congressional intent" apparently was designed to address
the "implicit" delegation on a "particular question" statement in
Chevron.397 The Court stated that "[it] can still be apparent from the
agency's generally conferred authority and other statutory
circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to
speak with the force of law." '398 I suspect this indicated undue Court
concern about some of its cases that Justice Scalia had construed as
giving Chevron deference in situations where the agency action did
not have the force of law. The four cases he cited in his Christensen
concurrence are examples. They were addressed earlier along with
two others he included in his Mead dissent.
For instance, in Mead, the Court defensively tried to support the
NationsBank decision where the Comptroller granted a bank
permission to broker annuities.399 Citing this case, Justice Souter said:
"[W]e have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even
when no such administrative formality was required and none was
391. Id. at 234 (citing Christensen v. Harris Cmty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).
392. Id. at 226 (citation omitted).
393. Id. at 226-27. Professor Russell L. Weaver contends that the Mead-
Christensen dual deference standards "produce the wrong balance" and are not
congruent with the reality of judicial review of agency legal determinations. Russell L.
Weaver, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Christensen, Mead and Dual Deference
Standards, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 173, 175-81 (2002).
394. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227.
395. Id. at 221.
396. Id. at 237.
397. Id. at 227.
398. Id. at 229.
399. Id. at 231.
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afforded.... ""' He need not have been so concerned about
NationsBank and the longstanding precedent concluding that
decisions of the Comptroller are entitled to Chevron deference. 40 '
NationsBank involved an APA agency licensing action which had the
force of law.
My research indicates that the Court has been consistent, and that
there are no straightforward examples of Chevron deference being
accorded to "mere authoritative agency positions." Chevron
deference is warranted in situations where there is some reasonable
basis for concluding that the agency action was based on delegated
authority, that it was consistent with the macromeaning of the
relevant legislation, and had the force of law.
Thus, Mead clarified Chevron fundamentals, 40 but it also left
several problems for our further study. Of course, there may be
others, but I will comment on five problems that are significant.
IV. MEAD CLARIFICATIONS OF CHEVRON
A. Delegated Authority Must Be Exercised to Qualify for Chevron
Deference
First, in Mead, the Court made clear that delegated authority must
be exercised if the agency interpretation is to qualify for Chevron
deference. Three of the Court's statements so indicate. For example,
it said: "We hold that administrative implementation of a particular
statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears
that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation
400. Id. (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co, 513
U.S. 251, 256-57, 263 (1995)).
401. See id. at 231 n.13.
402. Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and
Meta-Standards, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 807, 833-34 (2002). Professor Merrill also
concluded that Mead clarified Chevron. He said, in summary:
On the whole, "the Mead doctrine" is a sound development .... To be sure,
the decision comes up short in terms of articulating a meta-rule to guide
court[s] in future controversies .... But nothing the Court did or said
precludes future decisions that brush away the fuzziness in the majority's
exposition, leaving us with a clear and defensible meta-rule. Finally...
Mead secures a bright future for the Chevron doctrine .... With these
propositions established, judges are more likely to take Chevron
seriously .... In the long run this compact, but powerful, Chevron doctrine
should enhance, rather than retard, the transfer of interpretational power
from courts to agencies.
Id. But see William S. Jordan, III, Judicial Review of Informal Statutory
Interpretations: The Answer is Chevron Step Two, Not Christensen or Mead, 54
Admin. L. Rev. 719 (2002); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied
Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 Admin. L.
Rev. 735 (2002); Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion,
54 Admin. L. Rev. 771 (2002).
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claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority.""4 3  Also, "that a ruling may be precedent in later
transactions, precedential value alone does not add up to Chevron
entitlement; interpretive rules may sometimes function as
precedents,4" and they enjoy no Chevron status as a class.""4 5 Finally,
[i]ndeed, in holding here that Chevron left Skidmore intact and
applicable where statutory circumstances indicate no intent to
delegate general authority to make rules with force of law, or where
such authority was not invoked, we hold nothing more than we said
last Term in response to the particular statutory circumstances in
Christensen....
B. Implicit Delegation of Authority
Second, there is the problem of learning how post-Mead courts will
make decisions "recognizing that even without express authority to fill
a specific statutory gap, circumstances pointing to implicit
congressional delegation present a particularly insistent call for
deference.4 7  Implicit delegation may, of course, be derived by
statutory construction of imprecise language that indicates it should
be implied. In Chevron, the Court recognized that "[s]ometimes the
legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is
implicit. 48
Pre-Chevron, in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,4 °9 the Court found it
necessary to determine whether certain Department of Labor
regulations had the "force and effect of law" within the meaning of
the Trade Secrets Act,410 thereby authorizing government officers and
employees to disclose information concerning, inter alia, trade secrets
of persons or corporations or associations. The agency regulations in
question made available to the public Chrysler documents regarding
its equal employment opportunity and affirmative action programs.
The Court said
[t]he pertinent inquiry is whether under any of the arguable statutory
grants of authority the ... disclosure regulations relied on... are
reasonably within the contemplation of that grant of authority...
unless we were to hold that any federal statute that implies some
authority to collect information must grant legislative authority to
403. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27. Professor Weaver states the "force of law" standard
misdirects the deference decision. Weaver, supra note 393, at 181-90.
404. See Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 Duke L.J. 1463, 1472-73
(1992).
405. Mead, 533 U.S. at 232.
406. Id. at 237-38.
407. Id. at 237.
408. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
409. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
410. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2000).
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disclose that information to the public, it is simply not possible to
find in these statutes a delegation of the disclosure authority
asserted ....
This is not to say that any grant of legislative authority to a
federal agency by Congress must be specific before regulations
promulgated pursuant to it can be binding on courts in a manner
akin to statutes. What is important is that the reviewing court
reasonably be able to conclude that the grant of authority
contemplates the regulations issued.411
The case of Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin41 2 is another pre-
Chevron example of implicit delegation. The issue in Ford Motor
Credit was "whether the Truth in Lending Act ('TILA') requires that
the existence of an acceleration clause always be disclosed on the face
of a credit agreement. 41 3
The purpose of TILA is to promote informed use of credit by
requiring "meaningful disclosure of credit terms ' 414 to consumers.
Because of their complexity and variety, however, credit
transactions defy exhaustive regulation by a single statute. Congress
therefore delegated expansive authority to the Federal Reserve
Board to elaborate and expand the legal framework governing
commerce in credit .... For the reasons following we conclude that
the issue of acceleration disclosure is not governed by clear
expression in the statute or regulation, and that it is appropriate to
defer to the Federal Reserve Board and staff in determining what
resolution of that issue is implied by the truth-in-lending
enactments.415
In footnote eight, the Ford Court quoted from four Staff
Interpretation and Information Letters which the court of appeals had
"spurned ... [in an earlier case] as a source of interpretative guidance
on the ground that the several letters were 'conflicting signals.'
4 16
The Court, however, said the Opinion and Letters were
fundamentally consistent.
Accordingly, caution must temper judicial creativity in the face of
legislative or regulatory silence. At the very least, that caution
requires attentiveness to the views of the administrative entity
appointed to apply and enforce a statute. And deference is
especially appropriate in the process of interpreting the Truth in
Lending Act and Regulation Z. Unless demonstrably irrational,
Federal Reserve Board staff opinions construing the Act or
Regulation should be dispositive .... Congress delegated broad
411. Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 306, 308.
412. 444 U.S. 555 (1980).
413. Id. at 557 (citation omitted).
414. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000); Ford, 444 U.S. at 559.
415. Ford, 444 U.S. at 559-60.
416. Id. at 565 n.8.
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administrative lawmaking power to the Federal Reserve Board
when it framed TILA. The Act is best construed by those who gave
it substance in promulgating regulations thereunder.4 7
In footnote nine, the Court acknowledged that the administrative
interpretations involved in the case were
issued by Federal Reserve staff rather than the Board. The Court
said it would be unrealistic to draw a radical distinction between
opinions issued [by] the Board and those issued as official staff
memoranda. At any rate, it is unnecessary to explore the
Board/staff difference at length, because Congress has conferred
special status upon official staff interpretations .... Furthermore,
Congress has specifically designated the Federal Reserve Board and
staff as the primary source for interpretation and application of
truth-in-lending law.418
An amended statutory provision provided creditors with a defense
from liability upon good faith compliance with any interpretation or
approval by Federal Reserve staff authorized by the Board to issue
such interpretations or approvals: "The enactment and expansion of §
1640(f) has significance beyond the express creation of a good faith
immunity. That statutory provision signals an unmistakable
congressional decision to treat administrative rulemaking and
interpretation under TILA as authoritative." '419
The regulatory framework of TILA appears to consist of
circumstances pointing to implicit congressional delegation of
authority to the agency and its staff to take "authoritative agency
positions" that have the force of law.
C. Delegation of Authority by Congressional Expectation
Third, the Court recognized another method of identifying
delegation of authority that also would give agency action the force
and effect of law. Justice Souter said the following:
Yet it can still be apparent from the agency's generally conferred
authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would
expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it
addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted
law .... When circumstances implying such an expectation exist, a
417. Id. at 565-66.
418. Id. at 566.
419. Id. at 567-68. Further, the Court said:
The explicit purpose of the amendment was to relieve the creditor of the
burden of choosing "between the Board's construction of the Act and the
creditor's own assessment of how a court may interpret the Act".... Thus,
while not abdicating their ultimate judicial responsibility to determine the
law judges ought to refrain from substituting their own interstitial
lawmaking for that of the Federal Reserve so long as the latter's lawmaking
is not irrational.
Id. (citation omitted).
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reviewing court ... is obliged to accept the agency's position if
Congress has not previously spoken to the point at issue and the
agency's interpretation is reasonable .... [A]s significant as notice
and comment [rulemaking] is in pointing to Chevron authority, the
want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for we have
sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such
administrative formality was required and none was afforded. The
fact that the tariff classification here was not a product of such
formal process does not alone, therefore, bar the application of
Chevron. There are, nonetheless, ample reasons to deny Chevron
deference here. The authorization for classification rulings, and
Customs's practice in making them, present a case far removed not
only from notice-and-comment process, but from any other
circumstances reasonably suggesting that Congress ever thought of
classification rulings as deserving the deference claimed for them
here.420
Thus, the circumstances in Mead did not justify finding a
"congressional expectation" that Customs speaks with the force of law
in making classification rulings. Nevertheless, the Court created a
new, vague "congressional expectation" indicator of delegation of
authority. Where it is apparent from "the agency's generally
conferred authority and other statutory circumstances "421 "that
Congress would expect" it, definitive agency action will speak with the
force of law and Chevron deference will apply.422
I suspect that its new "congressional expectation" format for
identifying congressional delegation of authority to an agency to
speak with the force of law is, at least in part, designed to avoid having
to wrestle directly with the question of whether informal APA
adjudications also should be given Chevron deference. One could be
cynical and posit that, perhaps, the Court has not yet come to realize
that some of the cases reviewed are, in fact, informal APA
adjudications. I doubt that. It seems to me to be too obvious to be
overlooked by astute minds aided by astute clerks. Yet, no sitting
member of the current Court has expressly identified any of the
Chevron deference cases as based on informal APA adjudication.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, O'Connor, and
Stevens were, however, on the Court when it decided the 1990 case,
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. L TV Corp. ,423 discussed below in
Part IV.D. In that case the Court expressly applied Chevron
deference to an expressly recognized informal APA adjudication.
Nevertheless, informal adjudication in connection with Chevron
420. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001) (footnotes and citations
omitted).
421. Id. at 229.
422. Id.
423. 496 U.S. 633 (1990).
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deference has not been mentioned since by anyone on the Court and
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. has been ignored by the Court.
In his Mead dissent, Justice Scalia made at least five references to
the possibility that the Court's "congressional expectation" approach
to Chevron might also include informal adjudication. Even so, he
refrained from identifying any specific Court decision according
Chevron deference as based on an informal adjudication.
Two Court decisions in the 2001 Term appear to illustrate what
"generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances" will
suffice to justify a finding "that Congress would expect it." And,
therefore, there is a congressional delegation of authority justifying
Chevron deference to definitive agency action that is not based on
express or implied (by construction) delegation of rulemaking or
formal adjudication authority.
1. Wisconsin Department of Health & Family Services v. Blumer4 24
This case required the Court to interpret the "spousal
impoverishment" provisions of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage
Act of 1988 ("MCCA"). Those provisions permit a spouse living at
home to reserve, sheltered from diminution, certain income and assets
to meet the monthly minimum maintenance needs he or she will have
when the other spouse is institutionalized and becomes eligible for
Medicaid. In determining whether the community spouse is entitled
to shelter assets in excess of the standard resource allowance,
Wisconsin, along with a majority of the other states, uses an "income-
first" method as required by its statutes.
425
Irene Blumer challenged the income-first method as being
inconsistent with the MCCA provision governing upward revision of
the community spouse resource allowance. A divided Court, voting 6
to 3, concluded that neither the text of the statutory provision nor the
structure of the MCCA forbids the Wisconsin approach. Therefore,
the provision is ambiguous, and "[c]onsistent with the position
adopted by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, we hold that
the income-first method represents a permissible interpretation of the
Act. "426
The Secretary's position was adopted by having "issued several
statements supporting the income-first method. 4 27  Initially, the
Secretary interpreted the MCCA as requiring state hearing officers to
use that method. More recently, the Secretary concluded that the Act
permits both income-first and "some other reasonable interpretation
424. 534 U.S. 473 (2002).
425. Id. at 474.
426. Id. at 478.
427. Id. at 484.
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of the law."42 Most recently, the Secretary circulated for comment a
proposed rule allowing states the choice of either the income-first or
the resources-first method.
To justify its holding that the "position adopted" by the Secretary
was entitled to Chevron deference as a "congressional expectation"
that the agency would speak with the force of law, the Court referred
to the following factors: that it had long noted Congress' delegation
of "extremely broad regulatory authority" in the Medicaid area;429
that the Secretary had "never wavered from the position that the
income-first method represents at least a permissible interpretation of
the Act"; 43 0 that the Secretary's "significant expertise [was]
particularly appropriate in the context of a complex and highly
technical regulatory program";43 1 that the MCCA "affords large
discretion to the States" on the level of the minimum allowance
"accorded the community spouse... and the amount of assets the
couple is permitted to retain";432 and that nothing in the Act
persuaded the Court that similar latitude was inappropriate with
respect to application of the MCCA provision governing upward
revision of the community spouse resource allowance.433 Accordingly,
the Court concluded "[t]he Secretary's position warrants respectful
consideration. '434
The dissenters concluded that the statutory provision was not
ambiguous. Thus, they objected to the majority's paying respectful
consideration under Mead to the Secretary's opinion letter and policy
memoranda and giving them Chevron deference. Instead, they
believed the Secretary's position should be given only Skidmore-
Christensen deference under Mead. They would have given no
deference to the agency position, for they found the state statute to be
in conflict with the (unambiguous in their view) MCCA provision and,
therefore, invalid.
2. Barnhart v. Walton
Barnhart v. Walton435 was decided about six weeks after Blumer and
provided a second illustration of the elements of the "congressional
expectation" method of delegating authority. The case presented two
questions about the Social Security Administration's interpretation of
the term "disability" in the Social Security Act. First, the agency read
428. Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
429. Id. at 496 n.13.
430. Id. at 497 n.14.
431. Id. at 497 (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512
(1994)).
432. Id. (citations omitted).
433. Id. at 498.
434. Id. at 497 (citations omitted).
435. 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
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the term "inability" (to engage in any substantial gainful activity) as
including a "12 month" requirement.436 In its view the "inability"
must last, or be "expected to last," for at least twelve months. Second,
the agency read the phrase "expected to last" as applicable only when
the "inability" has not yet lasted twelve months.437  Under the
agency's interpretations, a person was not "disabled" if his inability
lasted less than twelve months, even if the inability was expected to
last twelve months or more.438
Applicant Walton was found to have suffered an "inability" for only
eleven months and, therefore, was not entitled to disability benefits.439
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the
statutory language was clear and unambiguous." Therefore, Walton
was entitled to benefits despite agency regulations restricting benefits
to an "inability" lasting twelve months. The court also decided that
because, prior to Walton's return to work, one would have expected
his "inability" to last twelve months, the agency regulations refusing
to look back to decide hypothetically whether the "inability" might
have been expected to last twelve months violated the clear command
of the statute. The government sought certiorari, pointing out that
this holding conflicted with those of other circuits, was contrary to
well-settled law, and would create additional social security costs of
$80 billion over ten years.4
The Supreme Court first held that the statute did not
unambiguously forbid the agency regulations, for it said nothing
explicit about the duration of "inability": "[S]uch silence, after all,
normally creates ambiguity. It does not resolve it." 442 Second, the
Court found the agency's interpretation permissible (i.e.,
reasonable)." 3 The agency's interpretation was said to make sense in
terms of the statute's basic objectives, and the agency regulations
reflected the agency's own longstanding interpretation.4"
Walton asked the Court "to disregard the Agency's interpretation
of its formal regulations on the ground that the agency only recently
promulgated those regulations, perhaps in response to the litigation
before the Court."445 The Court refused to do so, having previously
rejected similar arguments.
At this point the Court's opinion includes a lengthy essay on the
agency's longstanding interpretation of the statute. It explained that
436. Id. at 214-15.
437. Id. at 215.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 216.
441. Id. at 216-17.
442. Id. at 218.
443. Id. at 219.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 221.
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Christensen and Mead permit Chevron deference to agency
interpretations reached through means less formal than notice-and-
comment rulemaking, and it cited on this point NationsBank"6 as did
Justice Souter in Mead. NationsBank was said to indicate that
"[w]hether a court should give such deference depends in significant
part upon the interpretive method used and the nature of the question
at issue." 447
Then, the opinion listed the factors that led the Court to conclude
the agency's longstanding interpretation was lawful and entitled to
Chevron deference. Included were the following:
[T]he interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of
the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the
statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful
consideration the agency had given the question over a long period
of time .... 44' [Thus] Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens
through which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation here
at issue. 4 9
The elaboration of these factors indicates the Court had decided they
disclosed a "congressional expectation" that the agency's longstanding
interpretation of the statute should have the force of law.
Nevertheless, in a 2004 case, the Court appears to have pulled back
from some of the language in Barnhart that seems to say an agency's
"interpretation... of long standing," without more, may be
dispositive and entitled to Chevron deference. 5°
3. Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA451
The case involved litigation concerning the EPA's construction of
specified sections of the Clean Air Act. That construction was of long
standing and was expressed in three documents known as "guidance
memorand[a]" in 1983, 1988, and 1993.452 The Court said: "We
'normally accord particular deference to an agency interpretation of
'longstanding' duration,' recognizing that 'well-reasoned views' of an
expert administrator rest on 'a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance." 453
446. NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251
(1995).
447. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222.
448. Id.
449. Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)).
450. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 124 S.Ct. 983 (2004).
451. Id.
452. Id. at 987.
453. Id. (citations omitted); see also Katherine A. Rock, Alaska v. EPA: Supreme
Court Upholds the EPA's Authority Under the Clean Air Act, 56 Admin. L. Rev. 575,
579-83 (2004) (analyzing the Supreme Court's decision and its future impact).
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It continued by stating that the Court had "previously accorded
dispositive effect to EPA's interpretation of an ambiguous CAA
[Clean Air Act] provision" in Chevron. Even so, the agency's
interpretation here "presented in internal guidance memoranda,
however, does not qualify for the dispositive force described in
Chevron," as the Court notes, citing and quoting Christensen for the
proposition that interpretations in policy statements, agency manuals,
and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law, do not
warrant Chevron deference. Then the Court said: "Cogent
'administrative interpretations.., not [the] products of formal
rulemaking ... nevertheless warrant respect'. .. . We accord EPA's
reading of the relevant statutory provisions ... that measure of
respect. ' 454 Such respect was Skidmore-Christensen respect.
We now return to Barnhart and consider Walton's second claim
which was that the agency's regulation was invalid. He asserted that,
because the regulation rejected his interpretation of the words "can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months, 455
the statute would have allowed the agency to "look back" prior to his
return to work and would have required it to conclude both his
impairment and his "inability" to work "can be expected to last.., not
less than 12 months. 456
The Court concluded, however, that the agency regulation was valid
as a reasonable, hence permissible, interpretation of the statute. The
Court also confirmed the applicability of the "congressional
expectation" principle to its analysis of the regulation's validity. In
the final paragraph of its analysis of the rule, the Court said the
following:
The statute's complexity, the vast number of claims it engenders,
and the consequent need for agency expertise and administrative
experience lead us to read the statute as delegating to the Agency
considerable authority to fill in, through interpretation, matters of
detail related to its administration. The interpretation at issue here
is such a matter. The statute's language is ambiguous. And the
Agency's interpretation is reasonable. 4 57
454. Alaska, 540 U.S. at 1001 (citations omitted).
455. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 223 (2002).
456. Id.
457. Id. at 225 (citation omitted). Professor Robert Anthony contends this
statement, if taken seriously, would emancipate reviewing courts "from Mead's
mandate to test for delegation of force-of-law authority [and they] would enjoy
considerable freedom to decide Chevron's applicability vel non." Robert A. Anthony,
Keeping Chevron Pure, 5 Green Bag 2d 371, 373 (2002). He also points out that
Justice Breyer's 1986 essay on determining Chevron's applicability suggested that
reviewing courts could do so "by weighing sundry factors drawn from pre-Chevron
case law" such as those Breyer cited in Barnhart. Id. As Professor Anthony notes,
"Judge Breyer thought, a court could infer an implicit congressional intention that the
agency interpretation be accorded a certain (higher or lower) degree of deference.
But such an implied congressional intention does not amount to a delegation to act
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In a concurring opinion in Barnhart, Justice Scalia began by stating
that the agency regulations were entitled to Chevron deference, and
that he would not, therefore, go on to address the agency's prior
interpretations of the definition of "disability" in a ruling, a manual,
and a letter.458 He also disagreed with the Court's giving "particular
deference" to an agency's longstanding statutory interpretation.4 59 He
pointed out that since Chevron, there is a range of permissible
interpretations of statutory language and the agency is free to move
from one to another, so long as the most recent interpretation is
reasonable.46 °  Its antiquity should make no difference. Such
flexibility would permit policy-based changes by different
administrations, as exemplified in Chevron.
After expressing his concerns about the Court's elaborate
explanation of why the agency's longstanding interpretation of the
statute had the force of law, he said, "[i]f however, the Court does
wish to credit the SSA's earlier interpretations.., then I think the
Court should state why those interpretations were authoritative
enough (or whatever-else-enough Mead requires) to qualify for
deference., 461  He concluded by noting that the agency's recently
enacted "regulations emerged from notice-and-comment rulemaking
and merit deference. No more need be said. 462
Mead, Blumer, and Barnhart suggest the Court was anxious to
establish the "congressional expectation" method of determination
that agency action will have the force and effect of law. Its anxiety is
probably traceable to the fact that some of its post-Chevron opinions
may be said to have granted Chevron deference to agency action that,
indeed, had not involved the usual means by which agencies speak
with the force of law, i.e., rulemaking and formal adjudication.
The tension was introduced in Christensen and rose to a peak in
Mead, principally because of Justice Scalia's separate opinions in
those cases. In his lengthy dissent in Mead, Justice Scalia again cited
and discussed NationsBank, a case that was prominent in the Court's
opinion in Mead and in Barnhart. Again he criticized the Court for
ignoring cases in which it previously gave Chevron deference to
with the force of law, even an implied one." Id. at 373-74; see also Breyer, supra note
275, at 370-71, 381; Braun, supra note 236, at 998 (noting that factors such as
"contemporaneous" with enactment of the statute, "'consistent and longstanding,' or
'considered in a detailed and reasoned fashion.. . do not bear on the question
whether Congress delegated interpretive authority to the agency," but instead go to
the persuasiveness of the agency interpretation). See Adrian Vermeule, Introduction:
Mead in the Trenches, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 347 (2003), for a criticism of Mead's
approach permitting circumstances to indicate delegation of interpretive authority by
Congress.
458. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 226.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 226-27.
462. Id. at 227.
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agency "official positions" not arrived at through rulemaking or
formal adjudication.46 3 Manifestly, his contentions left the Court with
some explaining to do. It attempted to provide that explanation in the
Mead language quoted above and in its Blumer and Barnhart
opinions, above, but modified in Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation v. EPA.4m
D. Informal Adjudication
The Court's opinion in Mead identified three formats of agency
action that have the force and effect of law-rulemaking, formal
adjudication, and "congressional expectation." A fourth format also
warrants consideration although it was not mentioned expressly by the
Court. That format is informal adjudication. Although the Court said
in Mead "the overwhelming number of our cases applying Chevron
deference have reviewed the fruits of... formal adjudication,"465 there
are at least two examples of the Court's having applied Chevron to
informal adjudication, as considered earlier. NationsBank,4 6
discussed above in connection with Justice Scalia's concurring opinion
in Christensen,4 67 is the first. To repeat briefly, NationsBank involved
application by a bank, pursuant to a Comptroller's regulation,468 for
permission to serve as an agent in the sale of annuities.469  The
Comptroller granted that permission. Justice Souter in Mead, and
Justice Breyer in Barnhart, both used NationsBank to illustrate the
Court's application of Chevron deference to agency action in the
congressional expectation delegation format.
However, as discussed, agency process respecting the grant of a
permit is defined as "licensing" in the APA, and the APA also defines
"licensing" as a type of "adjudication" even though the process may
be informal. Thus, the Comptroller actually granted NationsBank a
license to broker annuities.47° It was an informal final agency
adjudicative action and had the force of law. As such it should
warrant Chevron deference.
In neither Mead nor Barnhart did the Court allude directly to the
fact that NationsBank was a case of informal adjudication under the
APA. Perhaps that was implied where, in Mead, the Court said "we
have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no
463. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,252-53 (2001).
464. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004).
465. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230.
466. NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251
(1995).
467. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 589 (2000); see also supra Part
III.C.2.
468. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 (1994).
469. NationsBank, 513 U.S. at 254-55.
470. Id. at 255.
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such administrative formality was required and none was afforded, 471
in reference to NationsBank. Rather, the Court applied the
"congressional expectation" delegation format.4
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.4 73 is the second example of the
Court's having applied Chevron to informal adjudication. This case
also was discussed in connection with Justice Scalia's concurrence in
Christensen.474
Again, to summarize briefly: the PBGC administers and enforces
Title IV of ERISA. LTV filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code with its Title IV retirement plans dramatically
underfunded.475 PBGC terminated the plans. Later, PBGC restored
the terminated plans. That meant the plans would be ongoing, and
that LTV would again be responsible for administering and funding
them. LTV refused to comply with the restoration decision. PBGC
instituted enforcement action in federal court.476
The Court agreed with PBGC, introduced the Chevron formula,
applied it and concluded the agency should be given deference.477 It
said that the agency determination was lawfully made by informal
adjudication in accord with the minimal requirements set forth in §
555 of the APA, which do not include the procedural elements argued
by LTV to be necessary. 478 Neither did the Due Process Clause
require them in this case. The Court held the PBGC procedures to be
consistent with the APA.479
Perhaps ninety percent of the federal agency "adjudications," as
defined by the APA, are informal. Lacking significant procedural
requirements in the APA, the actual procedures followed by the
agencies making informal adjudications must vary widely, and we
know little about those procedures.
The Court's hesitation to recognize expressly informal adjudication
as final agency action which has the force of law-and therefore
entitled to Chevron deference-is understandable. Yet, informal
adjudications are authorized generally by Congress through the APA,
and generally carry the force and effect of law. Some may provide a
fair proceeding while others may not. Even so, there are potential
controls on informal adjudication. If these controls were
implemented widely, the Court might be more inclined to recognize
informal adjudications as another format of agency action that
471. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231.
472. Id. at 229.
473. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990).
474. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231.
475. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 496 U.S. at 637.
476. Id. at 640-44.
477. Id. at 647.
478. Id. at 655.
479. Id. at 655-56.
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qualifies for Chevron deference. What is available to bring some
structure and consistency into this process?
We have some guidance from Overton Park410 about the
"administrative record" as a basis for decision. We know it must be
sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perform its functions. We
know that the agency legislation may provide some procedural
protections. We know that § 555 of the APA provides some non-
procedural protections, but little else. We know that applicable
agency procedural rules, if any, would structure the process and
provide consistency. We know that such procedural rules generally
are exempt from APA § 553 procedures and may be promulgated
efficiently. We know that procedural due process will apply in most
situations and may be asserted to assure what process would be due in
the particular situation. Although procedural due process is of
diminished importance or of no relevance in original application
situations, we know that equal protection of the laws is applicable to
original applications. Finally, we know that any relevant court case
decisions would apply.
A serious problem for potential court efforts to regularize informal
adjudication procedures is presented, however, by Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC.4 1 In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,
the Supreme Court held the lower court had violated Vermont Yankee
by imposing on the agency certain procedural rights not provided for
by the APA or by ERISA.
Hence, some nonjudicial way must be found to implement some of
these controls widely-perhaps uniformly-in informal adjudications.
To succeed, it should be some single unifying source of control over
such agency procedures. Possibly that source of control could be the
APA. Both the new principle of delegation of authority to speak with
the force of law through "congressional expectation" and informal
APA adjudication are unruly because they currently are not
controlled procedurally by the APA. Informal APA adjudication also
could be said to be an example of a congressional expectation that the
agency would speak with the force of law because Congress included
it in the APA. One possible approach would be to amend § 555(e) of
the APA by adding new language providing parties to informal
adjudications with notice of material on which the agency plans to
base a decision; affording parties an opportunity to offer contrary
evidence; conducting proceedings in accord with relevant procedural
rules; informing the parties of standards relevant to the decision; and
providing the parties with a statement explaining its reasoning in
applying those standards.
480. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
481. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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Some sort of amendment to § 555(e) could possibly have important
impacts. First, by regularizing rudimentary informal adjudication
procedures, the general quality and public acceptability of such
informal agency decisions could be enhanced without undue
formalization or inappropriate expense. Counsel and parties would
know more about how to prepare intelligently for informal
adjudications, and also be assured of a fundamentally fair process of
decision making. Courts could review more appropriate and more
useful administrative records-perhaps the Supreme Court could be
persuaded that such improved informal adjudications should receive
Chevron deference. If that could be accomplished, the Court would
not need to be embarrassed about its decisions (NationsBank and
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.) that already have given informal
adjudications Chevron deference, and it would not need to employ the
mask of "congressional expectation" to hide the fact that many such
decisions actually may constitute informal APA adjudications.
E. Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act
Fifth, there is the APA § 706482 problem that is significant to Justice
Scalia.483 The original introductory language of § 706 was included
because of disenchantment with the deferential bias of Gray and
Hearst. The language was supposed to stem the tide and make certain
courts decide the legal questions, A la Marbury. Post-APA court
practice demonstrates that the literal language has not been followed
and, of course, the Bumpers effort4'84 to amend the APA failed.
As early as 1950, Professor Nathanson concluded the § 706
language did not affect the micro-macro allocation model of scope of
review. He said the following:
[W]hen two conflicting interpretations of a statutory provision are
permissible under the language and relevant legislative history, the
court will give decisive weight to a rational administrative judgment
as to which interpretation will best effectuate the statutory
objectives ... [for] there is no conflict at all with the quoted
language of the Act. Despite the decisive weight given to the
administrative judgment with respect to evaluation of practical
consequences, by itself, under this view, takes full responsibility for
the ultimate determination with respect to the meaning of the
statute....
482. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) ("[T]he reviewing court shall decide all relevant
questions of law, interpret... statutory provisions.").
483. The issue was raised by Justice Scalia in his Mead dissent. He contended the
court had not been faithful to this APA provision. See United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 241-43 & n.2 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
484. See James T. O'Reilly, Deference Makes a Difference: A Study of Impacts of
the Bumpers Judicial Review Amendment, 49 U. Cin. L. Rev. 739, 747-67 (1980)
(describing Congressional attempts to amend the judicial review provisions of the
APA from 1975-1980).
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When administrative action involves the exercise of delegated
authority to implement broad statutory standards.., the area of
administrative judgment is no more aptly described as statutory
interpretation, than a similar exercise of judgment in the grant or
denial of a license or the establishment of a reasonable rate for the
future. Such an exercise of judgment is hardly a determination of
law within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act; and
even if it were, it would clearly be within the scope of the exception
provided ... for "agency action ... by law committed to agency
discretion. 485
F. Justice Scalia's Criticism of Skidmore Deference
In his Mead dissent, Justice Scalia also criticized the Court for
reviving the Skidmore case, which he considered to be anachronistic
after the Chevron decision.
1. The Scalia Criticism
"There is, in short, no way to avoid the ossification of federal law
that today's opinion sets in motion. What a court says is the law after
according Skidmore deference will be the law forever, beyond the
power of the agency to change even through rulemaking."486
2. The Court's Mead Response
The Court did not respond directly to Justice Scalia's charge in its
Mead opinion. Nevertheless, it did include some explanatory
comment on its decision to recognize both Chevron and Skidmore
deference. First, it said the position it had taken
is a choice about the best way to deal with an inescapable feature of
the body of congressional legislation authorizing administrative
action. That feature is the great variety of ways in which the laws
invest the Government's administrative arms with discretion, and
with procedures for exercising it, in giving meaning to Acts of
Congress. 487
Second, the Court made clear that the Judiciary is obligated to
defer to some administrative action. It said the following:
Although we all accept the position that the Judiciary should defer
to at least some of this multifarious administrative action, we have to
decide how to take account of the great range of its variety .... The
Court's choice has been to tailor deference to variety. This
acceptance of the range of statutory variation has led the Court to
recognize more than one variety of judicial deference, just as the
485. Nathanson, supra note 23, at 490-92 (citation omitted).
486. Mead, 533 U.S. at 249-50.
487. Id. at 235-36.
2004] 1179
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Court has recognized a variety of indicators that Congress would
expect Chevron deference.
488
Third, and more specifically directed to Skidmore, the Court stated:
"The Court... said nothing in Chevron to eliminate Skidmore's
recognition of various justifications for deference depending on
statutory circumstances and agency action .... Indeed, in holding
here that Chevron left Skidmore intact.., we hold nothing more than
we said ... in Christensen ....
Finally, the Court summarized its position on judicial deference:
We think in sum, that Justice Scalia's efforts to simplify ultimately
run afoul of Congress's indications that different statutes present
different reasons for considering respect for the exercise of
administrative authority or deference to it. Without being at odds
with congressional intent much of the time, we believe that judicial
responses to administrative action must continue to differentiate
between Chevron and Skidmore, and that continued recognition of
Skidmore is necessary for just the reasons Justice Jackson gave when
that case was decided.49 °
Justice Breyer made a comment about Skidmore's vitality in his
dissent in Christensen. He stated that Chevron made no relevant
change, but simply focused on an additional, separate legal reason for
deferring to certain agency determinations. The reason was that
Congress had delegated to the agency the legal authority to make
those determinations. He concluded: "I believe that Skidmore
nonetheless retains legal vitality. If statutes are to serve the human
purposes that called them into being, courts will have to continue to
pay particular attention in appropriate cases to the experienced-based
views of expert agencies." '491
3. A Case Analysis Response to Justice Scalia
a. Skidmore Revisited
Any nonjudicial response to Justice Scalia should begin at the
beginning, with a brief review of Skidmore.4 92 The case involved the
question of overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act for
inactive duty in the company fire-hall. This involved no task except to
answer alarms. The employees involved brought an action to recover
overtime pay for their service. The district court denied their claim
and the circuit court of appeals affirmed that decision.
488. Id. at 236-37 (footnote omitted).
489. Id. at 237-38.
490. Id. at 238.
491. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 597 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
492. For the initial analysis of Skidmore, see supra Part I.B.1.
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The Administrator of the Act had no authority to promulgate
regulations having the force of law, but based on his executive
responsibility to implement it and bring injunction actions to restrain
violations, he "set forth his views of the application of the Act under
different circumstances in an interpretative bulletin and in informal
rulings." '493 The Court noted that these materials "provide a practical
guide to employers and employees as to how the office representing
the public interest in its enforcement will seek to apply it. '49 4 It
continued:
[T]he conclusion of the Administrator... is that [in this case] the
general tests which he has suggested point to the exclusion of
sleeping and eating time of these employees from the workweek and
the inclusion of all other on-call time. ... There is no statutory
provision as to what, if any, deference courts should pay to the
Administrator's conclusions. And, while we have given them notice,
we have had no occasion to try to prescribe their influence ....
They are not, of course, conclusive, even in the cases with which
they directly deal.. . . They do not constitute an interpretation of
the Act or a standard for judging factual situations which binds a
district court's processes ....
Significantly, the Court explained the administrative-judicial
relationship as follows:
But the Administrator's policies are made in pursuance of official
duty, based upon more specialized experience and broader
investigations and information than is likely to come to a judge in a
particular case. They do determine the policy which will guide
applications for enforcement by injunction on behalf of the
Government. Good administration of the Act and good judicial
administration alike require that the standards of public
enforcement and those for determining private rights shall be at
variance only where justified by very good reasons.... This Court
has long given considerable and in some cases decisive weight to
Treasury Decisions and to interpretative regulations of the Treasury
and of other bodies that were not of adversary origin.4 96
Having explained the importance of congruity between
administrative and judicial administration except where "justified by
493. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 138 (1944). The Department of Labor
later acquired rulemaking authority with respect to the provisions in issue in
Christensen. Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, 99
Stat. 790 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-216 (2000)). Had it exercised that authority in
Christensen, Chevron deference would have applied. The fact that the agency did not
have rulemaking authority at the time of Skidmore is not significant, for in both
Skidmore and Christensen the agency did not act in a format that had the force of law.
As Mead makes clear, for Chevron deference to apply such delegated authority must
be employed. See Levin, supra note 402, at 804.
494. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 138.
495. Id. at 139.
496. Id. at 139-40.
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very good reasons," the Court addressed the district court's approach
to its decision on the validity of the workers' claim. First, it noted that
in a companion case 97 the lower courts had weighed the evidence in
the particular case "in the light of the Administrator's rulings and
reached a result consistent therewith.""49 Thus, the lower courts in
Armour were "persuaded" that the administrative interpretation of
the statute was correct and they gave it effect.
However, in Skidmore, the district court had found the evidentiary
facts as stipulated, but had made no findings of fact as to whether
under the arrangement of the parties and the circumstances of the
case, the fire hall duty or any part thereof constituted working time.
Instead, it found as a conclusion of law that "the time plaintiffs spent
in the fire-hall subject to call to answer fire alarms does not constitute
hours worked, for which overtime compensation is due them under
the Fair Labor Standards Act, as interpreted by the Administrator
and the Courts ....
The Court continued with the following: "But in this case, although
the District Court referred to the Administrator's Bulletin, its
evaluation and inquiry were apparently restricted by its notion that
waiting time may not be work, an understanding of the law which we
hold to be erroneous." 5°° Earlier in its opinion the Court had said that
the "[f]acts may show that the employee was engaged to wait, or they
may show that he waited to be engaged .... The law does not impose
an arrangement upon the parties. It imposes upon the courts the task
of finding what the arrangement was."10'
Therefore, Skidmore demonstrates clearly the responsibility of
reviewing courts to give serious consideration to the administrative
viewpoint when performing the role of "saying what the law is" where
the agency has not acted in a format that has the force of law.5" If
Skidmore's teaching is taken seriously, reviewing courts will not leap
to assert their authority to reject an administrative interpretation as
''not persuasive" without having first considered carefully the need for
judicial administration to work in harmony with good administration
of legislation." 3 If they do that, but are "not persuaded" by the
administrative viewpoint, the ossification of the law on the point at
497. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1944).
498. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
499. Id. at 136 (internal quotation marks omitted).
500. Id. at 140.
501. Id. at 137.
502. NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944) ("Undoubtedly
questions of statutory interpretation.., are for the courts to resolve, giving
appropriate weight to the judgment of those whose special duty is to administer the
questioned statute."); see Levin, supra note 402, at 782-83.
503. "For a court to attempt to answer these questions without the views of the
agencies responsible for enforcing ERISA, would be to 'embar[k] upon a voyage
without a compass."' Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 726 (1989) (quoting Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980)).
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issue will have been justified by very good reasons.
Skidmore was decided in 1944-eight months after the same Court
decided Hearst. Therefore, it was well aware of the allocation of the
micromeaning and macromeaning legal issues it made in the Hearst
formal agency adjudication that had the force of law. In Skidmore it
again demonstrated its understanding of the constitutional separation
of powers principle, and its respect for the administrative process.
Although the agency interpretation did not have the force of law and
thus released the Court from any duty to allocate any authority over
the legal question to the agency, it did not decide the question without
first considering carefully the agency view. In the final analysis, the
Court was persuaded and it accepted the Administrator's
interpretation of the Act that waiting time may be time worked, but
that sleeping and eating time may not be included. The lower courts
in Armour had so ruled and the Court affirmed.5"
b. Analysis of Cases Cited by Justice Scalia in Mead
As support for his "ossification" of the law charge, Justice Scalia
cited three of the Court's cases to illustrate that stare decisis would
bar any attempt by an agency to make an interpretation of its
legislation that conflicted with an earlier Court interpretation. 0
Those cases are analyzed below.
i. Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc.
In Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc.,5°6 a common
carrier sued to recover freight undercharges for interstate shipments
performed by its subsidiary for a shipper. 7 The subsidiary had
privately negotiated rates with the shipper that were lower than its
rates on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"). 50 8
The carrier later filed for bankruptcy and an audit disclosed massive
undercharges resulting from the subsidiary's practice of billing the
shipper at the lower negotiated rates instead of the filed rates.0 9
Although billed for the undercharges, the shipper refused to pay. The
shipper's right to refuse payment under a new ICC policy that relieved
the shipper of the obligation to pay the filed rate when the shipper
and the carrier had negotiated a lower rate.10
The district court found these matters to be within the primary
jurisdiction of the ICC, stayed the proceeding, and referred the case to
504. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 134 (1944).
505. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001).
506. 497 U.S. 116 (1990).
507. Id. at 122.
508. Id. at 123.
509. Id.
510. Id.
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the ICC.11 The ICC ruled in the shipper's favor, rejecting the
carrier's argument that the Commission lacked the statutory power to
release a shipper from liability for such undercharges. After return to
the district court, the court granted summary judgment for the
shipper."' The circuit court affirmed, agreeing that the ICC's new
policy was consistent with the Act.513
On review, the Supreme Court held that there was a strict statutory
duty to follow rate requirements and that the new ICC policy was
inconsistent with the Interstate Commerce Act. It reversed the circuit
court and remanded the case for further determination. It stated that
[t]his Court has long understood that the filed rate governs the legal
relationship between shipper and carrier .... This stringent rule
prevails, because otherwise the paramount purpose of Congress-
prevention of unjust discrimination-might be defeated.... This
rule is undeniably strict and it obviously may work hardship in some
cases, but it embodies the policy which has been adopted by
Congress in the regulation of interstate commerce in order to
prevent unjust discrimination.... [T]he departure from the filed
tariff schedule that the ICC set forth in its.., policy rests on an
interpretation of the Act that is contrary to the language and
structure of the statute as a whole and the requirements that make
up the filed rate doctrine in particular. 514
The ICC argued that its interpretation of the statute was entitled to
Chevron deference, but the Court disagreed.
For a century, this Court has held that the Act... forbids as
discriminatory the secret negotiation and collection of rates lower
than the filed rate .... The ICC has permitted the very price
discrimination that the Act by its terms seeks to prevent....
Compliance with [rate requirements] is utterly central to the
administration of the Act .... [This policy] conflicts directly with
the core purposes of the Act.515
The quoted language makes clear that the Court perceived the legal
question to be one of the fundamental, underlying purposes of the
Interstate Commerce Act for it to decide independently under the
Gray-Hearst-Chevron-Mead allocation model as a macromeaning
issue.
On the stare decisis point the Court said, "[o]nce we have
determined a statute's clear meaning, we adhere to that determination
under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency's later
interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of the
511. Id. at 124.
512. Id. at 125.
513. Id.
514. Id. at 126-30 (internal quotations omitted).
515. Id. at 130-33 (internal quotations omitted).
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statute's meaning., 516 It is apparent that the Court's purpose was to
"ossify" the law on this point to prevent any further ICC attempt to
deviate from the filed rate doctrine. In this situation, the Court's
decision was appropriate.
ii. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB517
In this case a union filed an unfair labor practice charge against a
company with the NLRB. It asserted the company had barred
nonemployee organizers from its property in violation of the
NLRA.518 Applying Board criteria, an ALJ ruled in the union's
favor.519 The Board affirmed the AL's judgment and adopted the
recommended order.52 A divided panel of the court of appeals
denied the company's petition for review and enforced the Board's
order. 51 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Section 7 of the NLRA provides that "[e]mployees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations., 52" The Court said that "[b]y its plain terms, thus, the
NLRA confers rights only on employees, not on unions or their
nonemployee organizers. 5 23 It added, however, that in the 1956
Babcock case,524 the Court recognized that employees' right of self-
organization may depend on their ability to learn the advantage of
self-organization from others. Therefore, in certain limited
circumstances § 7 of the NLRA may restrict an employer's right to
exclude nonemployee union organizers from his property.
In Babcock, before the NLRB, the union successfully challenged
the company's refusal to allow nonemployee union organizers on its
property. The Board acknowledged that there were alternative, non-
trespassory means for the union to communicate with employees, but
it held that contact at the workplace was preferable and ordered the
company to allow the organizers to distribute literature on the
company's parking lot and exterior walkway.525
The court of appeals refused to enforce the Board's order and the
Supreme Court affirmed. It found the Board had erred by failing to
make the "critical distinction" between the organizing activities of
employees and nonemployees. As a rule, then, an employer cannot
be compelled to allow distribution of literature by nonemployee union
516. Id. at 131.
517. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
518. Id. at 529.
519. Id. at 531.
520. Id.
521. Id. at 533.
522. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
523. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 532.
524. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
525. Id. at 107-08.
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organizers on his property, for "no such obligation is owed
nonemployee [union] organizers. 52 6 Thus, Babcock indicates that an
employer may not always bar nonemployee union organizers from his
property, but "his right to do so remains the general rule. 527 To gain
access, the union must show that no other reasonable means of
communication exists. "That the burden imposed on the union is a
heavy one is evidenced by the fact that the balance struck by the
Board and the courts under the Babcock accommodation principle
has rarely been in favor of trespassory organizational activity." '
Nevertheless, the Board apparently believed that the Supreme
Court had modified its Babcock holding in a later case. Thus, it
created a three-factor balancing test to apply in all such nonemployee
access cases. In Lechmere, citing its role as the agency responsible for
implementing national labor policy, the Board maintained its
balancing principle was entitled to judicial deference. The Court
declined to do so, finding that it conflicted with Babcock, and then it
quoted the stare decisis language from Maislin. It noted that "[i]n
Babcock... we held that the Act drew a distinction 'of substance'
between the union activities of employees and nonemployees."529 The
Board's error in Lechmere was its failure to implement the Babcock
principle that "it is only where ... access is infeasible""53 that it
becomes necessary and proper to balance employee and employer
rights. The Court concluded: "We cannot accept the Board's
conclusion, because it 'rest[s] on erroneous legal foundations.' As we
have explained, the exception to Babcock's rule is a narrow one. "531
Justice Stevens dissented in Lechmere, but said the Babcock
decision "rejected the Board's view that the rules applicable to union
organizing draw no distinction between employees and
nonemployees.'532
In its Babcock opinion the Court had made clear that the legal
question was one concerning the fundamental, underlying
macromeaning purposes of the National Labor Relations Act. It said
as follows:
This is not a problem of always open or always closed doors for
union organization on company property. Organization rights are
granted to workers by the same authority, the National
Government, that preserves property rights. Accommodation
between the two must be obtained with as little destruction of one as
is consistent with the maintenance of the other. The employer may
526. Id. at 113.
527. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 205 (1978).
528. Id.
529. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527,537 (1992) (citation omitted).
530. Id. at 538.
531. Id. at 539 (quoting Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112).
532. Id. at 548.
1186 [Vol. 73
BURSTING THE CHEVRON BUBBLE
not affirmatively interfere with organization; the union may not
always insist that the employer aid organization. But when the
inaccessability of employees makes ineffective the reasonable
attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them through the
usual channels, the right to exclude from property has been required
to yield to the extent needed to permit communication of
information on the right to organize. 533
Therefore, under the pre-Chevron "well-settled principles" of
judicial review of agency legal determinations by means of the Gray-
Hearst allocation model, the legal question in Babcock was one
properly for the Court to decide independently. Its only obligation
was to be "slow to overturn an administrative decision 5 34 by the
agency having the responsibility of applying the Act to infinite
combinations of events.
iii. Neal v. United States535
This is the most recent of the cases cited by Justice Scalia. It
concerned the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the United
States Sentencing Commission. A prisoner had been convicted of
possession of LSD. He was subject to the ten-year mandatory
minimum sentence specified in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.536
After his sentencing, the Commission revised the method of
calculating the weight of LSD in the Guidelines. Departing from its
former approach of weighing the entire "mixture or substance"
containing LSD, the amended Guideline instructed courts to give each
dose of LSD on a carrier medium a constructive or presumed weight
of 0.4 milligrams.
The revised Guideline was retroactive and one month later the
prisoner filed a motion to modify his sentence. He contended the
weight of the LSD attributable to him under the amended Guideline
was 4.58 grams. For that amount, the applicable sentencing range
would be seventy to eighty-seven months of imprisonment, or
approximately five to seven years. The 4.58 gram calculation would
be well short of the ten grams necessitating a ten-year minimum
sentence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict
among the courts of appeals over whether the revised Guideline
governed the calculation of the weight of LSD for purposes of §
841(b)(1) of the Act.
The decision in Neal was based on the Court's earlier decision in
Chapman v. United States.537 In that case, the Court had interpreted
533. Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112.
534. Id.
535. 516 U.S. 284 (1996).
536. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000).
537. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
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the provision of the Act that provided a mandatory minimum
sentence of five years for trafficking in an LSD "mixture or
substance" that weighed one gram or more. As it explained, "LSD is
diffused among the fibers of the paper .... and the LSD cannot be
distinguished from the blotter paper, nor easily separated from it."
5 38
Therefore, the Court held that the actual weight of the blotter paper,
with its absorbed LSD was determinative under the statute.539
The prisoner in Neal contended that the method approved in
Chapman was no longer appropriate. In his view the Commission
intended its newer dose-based method to supplant the actual weight
method used in Chapman. The prisoner conceded that the
Commission did not have the authority to amend the statute
construed in Chapman, but argued, nonetheless, that because the
Commission is charged with responsibility for interpreting penalty
statutes and is expert in sentencing matters, its later construction of
the statute should be given Chevron deference. The prisoner's
position was that Congress intended the Commission's rulemaking to
respond to judicial decisions in developing a coherent sentencing
structure, thus deference was appropriate even though its newer
interpretation postdated Chapman.
The Court commented that the Commission's choice of an
alternative method for weighing LSD did not alter its interpretation of
the statute in Chapman. Initially, it said it was doubtful that the
Commission intended the dose-based method to displace the actual-
weight method that Chapman required for statutory minimum
sentences. The Commission's commentary on the Guideline
suggested to the Court that the Guideline calculation was independent
of the statutory calculation, and that the statute controls if they
conflict. Hence, the Commission appeared to do no more than
acknowledge it had no authority to override the statute as the Court
had construed it. At that point the Court said: "Were we, for
argument's sake, to adopt petitioner's view ... he still would not
prevail. The Commission's dose-based method cannot be squared
with Chapman."54  It continued with a statement that in those
circumstances the Court did not need to decide what, if any, deference
was due the Commission in order to reject its contrary interpretation,
because of the doctrine of stare decisis. It followed with the stare
decisis quote from Lechmere and Maislin.54'
The language used by the Court in its Chapman opinion indicates
that there, too, it perceived the question to be at the fundamental,
underlying purposes meaning of the statute. Accordingly, it was a
question for the Court to decide independently. Examples include the
538. Id. at 462.
539. Id. at 468.
540. Neal, 516 U.S. at 294.
541. Id. at 294-95.
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following:
[T]he statute refers to a mixture or substance containing a
detectable amount. [So long as it contains a detectable amount,] the
entire mixture or substance is to be weighed when calculating the
sentence. This reading is confirmed by the structure of the
statute.... Thus, with respect to these two drugs [PCP and
methamphetamine], Congress clearly distinguished between the
pure drug and a "mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount" of the pure drug. But with respect to drugs such as LSD
. .. Congress declared that sentences should be based exclusively on
the weight of the "mixture or substance." Congress knew how to
indicate that the weight of the pure drug was to be used to
determine a sentence, and did not make that distinction with respect
to LSD.... Congress clearly intended the dilutant, cutting agent, or
carrier medium to be included in the weight of those drugs for
sentencing purposes.... Congress did not want to punish retail
traffickers less severely, even though they deal in smaller quantities
of the pure drug, because such traffickers keep the street markets
going.... The penalty scheme set out in the [Act] is intended to
punish severely large-volume drug traffickers at any level....
Blotter paper seems to be the carrier of choice, and the vast majority
of cases will therefore do exactly what the sentencing scheme was
designed to do-_punish more heavily those who deal in larger
amounts of drugs."'
4. Summary of Case Analysis Response
This analysis of the relevant cases concerning Skidmore deference
and Justice Scalia's criticism, is based on the allocation model of scope
of judicial review illustrated by Gray-Hearst. The allocation model is
part of the "well-established principles" of judicial review in place
pre-Chevron that in my judgment were applied in Chevron and later
clarified in Mead. Therefore, the analysis is based on the premise that
Chevron was an evolved version of Gray-Hearst rather than a
watershed case that established a new regime of scope of judicial
review. Some of the implications of the analysis should be identified.
First, Skidmore made clear the congruity necessary to be
maintained between good administration of legislation and good
judicial administration. It teaches us that they should be at variance
only where "justified by very good reasons." '543
Second, we learn from Skidmore that courts should consider
carefully the views of agencies in situations where the agency action is
not in a format that has the force of law, although in that context, the
reviewing court has no legal obligation to do so.
Third, the cases cited by Justice Scalia as examples of the stifling
542. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 453-54.
543. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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effect of applying Skidmore deference teach that the Court has, in
fact, heeded Justice Jackson's admonition. The baseline cases all
illustrated independent Court judgment at the fundamental,
underlying purposes meaning of the statutes. The Court did not rush
to judgment in any of them although it clearly acted in its Marbury
role to "say what the law is." Because the various issues decided were
fundamental to the statute construed, the Court thereby demonstrated
that in some situations it is quite appropriate for reviewing courts to
ossify the law at the fundamental statutory meaning level to prevent
an agency from further attempts to develop conflicting policies
through construction.
Fourth, based on its opinions in these cases, there is reason to
believe the Court is sensitive to the respect for agencies implicit in the
separation of powers principle and that it (and presumably the lower
courts) will not assert its independent authority in a whimsical
manner. Being aware of the "ossification" problem inherent in saying
what the law is, reviewing courts may be expected to respond more
readily to agency advocacy that is designed to persuade where it
cannot control. Indeed, the congruity approach suggests reviewing
courts should feel obligated to consider agency views when making a
decision in their Marbury role. If these themes from the cases are
implemented, perhaps the dire consequences of applying Skidmore
deference perceived by Justice Scalia will prove to be more fanciful
than real.
5. Responses by Other Commentators
Other commentators also have addressed the stare decisis-
ossification problem. Most of them appear to have accepted Chevron
as a watershed case, ushering in a new mode of scope of judicial
review of agency legislative interpretations. Thus, these
commentators seem to accept much of the conventional wisdom,
confused though it is, about the meaning of Chevron and they build on
that foundation.
One approach suggests that Skidmore constructions should be
considered to be defeasible, judicial policy judgments rather than as
definitive declarations of what the law is.5" Another commentator
proposes that a Chevron-eligible interpretation by an agency should
trump a federal court's provisional precedent construing the statute.545
A third concludes that Skidmore constructions should serve only as
persuasive dicta for a future court and that agencies should be able to
overrule Skidmore decisions with legislative rules that would warrant
544. Richard Murphy, A "New" Counter-Marbury: Reconciling Skidmore
Deference and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 56 Admin. L. Rev. 1 (2004).
545. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in
Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1272 (2002).
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Chevron deference.546 Professor Richard Murphy also suggests that
the Court's decision in Edelman v. Lynchburg College,547 responds
obliquely to Justice Scalia's charge, where it says: "We, of course, do
not mean to say that the EEOC's position is the 'only one
permissible."'548 He concludes that the Court majority implied that
agency interpretive flexibility can survive a judicial construction
without reliance on the Chevron framework.
V. SYNTHESIZING RECURRING THEMES OF SCOPE OF REVIEW: A
MODEL FOR THE FUTURE
Based on the research and analysis presented in this Article, I
suggest a basic model for the scope of court review of agency
legislative determinations. The model is based on a synthesis of
recurring themes the Court has applied in scope of review decisions
from Gray-Hearst to Skidmore, Addison, BATF v. FLRA, Chevron,
and in later cases through Christensen, Mead, Blumer, Barnhart, and
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation. Accordingly,
with further refinement, if the need arises, it should be applied by
courts in future cases.
Chevron is the case commonly cited by federal courts on scope of
review, and its clarification was the focus of the Supreme Court's
decision in Mead. Therefore, the courts probably will continue to
begin with a recitation of its two-step formulation, although the so-
called two-step was not innovative as a principle of statutory
interpretation by courts.
Although Chevron may continue to be the case commonly cited,
Mead makes clear that it is inappropriate to view Chevron as a
seminal case, as some have perceived it to be. The Court itself said
Chevron was based on well-settled principles. The BATF v. FLRA
case decided by the same Court in the same Term and a short six
months before Chevron reaffirmed the well-settled principles. Pre-
Chevron precedents remain alive and well and the Court's 1944
decision in Skidmore was expressly reaffirmed in Christensen and
Mead. The Marshall and Blackmun papers disclose nothing unusual
about Chevron. Christensen made clear that Chevron deference does
not apply to agency interpretations lacking the force of law, for
Skidmore controls in that context Finally, Mead made clear that
Chevron deference applies where Congress delegated legislative or
adjudicative authority to the agency, and the agency employed it in
making a legal determination having the force of law.
546. Paul A. Dame, Note, Stare Decisis, Chevron and Skidmore: Do
Administrative Agencies Have the Power to Overrule Courts?, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
405 (2002).
547. 535 U.S. 106 (2002); Murphy, supra note 544, at 32-36.
548. Edelman, 535 U.S. at 114 n.8.
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A. The First Phase of the Reviewing Court's Analysis
In this phase of its analysis, the reviewing court's goal should be to
determine whether the Chevron deference formulation will apply in
the particular situation. That is, the court should make this initial
determination before attempting to apply the Chevron formulation to
the case. There are threshold issues that should be addressed to make
that determination. They are:
If the precise question at issue addresses the fundamental, core
macromeaning of the statute, the Chevron formulation will not
apply. Because Congress cannot delegate to an agency authority to
determine the ultimate meaning of a statute, the reviewing court
should move into its Marbury "say what the law is" role.
Accordingly, the court should determine, independently, this
macromeaning issue while according the agency views respectful
consideration and whatever Skidmore-Christensen deference it
deems persuasive.
If, however, the court is unable to conclude that the precise question
at issue is a fundamental macromeaning question, it should,
nevertheless, consider the remaining threshold issues. It should not
yet assume that Chevron deference may or will apply.
If the court determines that Congress has not delegated to the
agency legislative or judicial authority to interpret the precise
question at issue with the force of law, the Chevron formulation will
not apply. Although they are conceptually separate, the delegation
question is functionally related to the micromeaning-macromeaning
nature of the precise question at issue. The Court's opinions suggest
that Congress is less likely to delegate to an agency force of law
interpretive authority to determine a question that approaches the
fundamental, core macromeaning of a statute. Hence, the nature of
the specific question may aid the court in determining the delegation
question, and vice versa.
If the court determines that the agency has been delegated
legislative or judicial authority to interpret the precise question at
issue with the force of law, but that the agency did not exercise its
delegated authority to make the statutory interpretation, the
Chevron formulation will not apply.
If, at this point, the reviewing court cannot conclude that the precise
question at issue addresses the fundamental, core macromeaning of
the statute, it should apply the Chevron formulation, provided none
of the threshold issues indicate that it will not apply. In most cases,
the court will be able to determine whether the specific issue
addresses the statute's macromeaning, but if not, the court should
proceed to apply the Chevron formulation.
If the court determines that the precise question at issue addresses
an interstitial application, or other micromeaning interpretation of
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the statute, it should apply the Chevron formulation, provided none
of the threshold issues indicates it will not apply.
Assuming the court has canvassed the threshold issues and has
determined that in the case before it there is no indication the
Chevron formulation will not apply, it should begin the process of
implementing the Chevron principles.
B. The Chevron Two-Step Formulation
1. Chevron Step One
Chevron step one is not really different from the standard methods
of statutory interpretation that preceded it. Those methods are,
primarily, the plain meaning approach and the legislative purpose
approach that courts have employed for many years. All statutory
interpretation methods seek to ascertain what Congress intended with
respect to the specific issue presented.
If, after its analysis, having employed the traditional tools of
statutory construction, the reviewing court finds that on the precise
question at issue the intent of Congress is clear, that intent must be
given effect, without deference to the agency's interpretation.
If, however, the court finds that Congress did not address the
precise question at issue and the statute is silent on the point, it should
apply Chevron step two. Likewise, if Congress did address the specific
issue, but the court finds that its expression of intention is ambiguous,
it should apply Chevron step two.
2. Chevron Step Two
Having found at step one that the statute is either silent or
ambiguous with respect to congressional intent on the precise
question at issue, the reviewing court should apply step two. That is,
the court should determine whether the agency's interpretation is
based on a "permissible" or "reasonable" construction of the statute.
There are several significant questions, among others, that the court
should consider in deciding whether the agency's interpretation is a
permissible or reasonable construction warranting Chevron deference:
What is the micromeaning-macromeaning nature of the precise
question at issue? Is it clearly an interstitial application or other
micromeaning interpretation of the statute? Or is it an issue that
shades toward the fundamental, core macromeaning of the statute? If
the latter, what are the possible ramifications of its interpretation by
the agency?
Another important question is whether the agency interpretation of
the precise question at issue is "permissible" or "reasonable" in light
of the fundamental, underlying core purposes of the statute? Or, as
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the Court has put it: "If the administrator's reading fills a gap or
defines a term in a way that is reasonable in light of the legislature's
revealed design, we give the administrator's judgment 'controlling
weight.' ' 541
C. The Second Phase of the Reviewing Court's Analysis-Auxiliary
Matters
1. Rulemaking
Ordinarily, delegation of legislative authority is accomplished by
statutory language authorizing an agency to promulgate such rules or
regulations as it deems necessary to administer the statute. In
addition, such delegation may be limited in scope or applicability or
both. Delegation of legislative authority also may be implied by
judicial construction of agency statutes. Most agencies are subject to
the APA, and such rules are termed "Substantive Rules-rules other
than organizational or procedural ... issued by an agency pursuant to
statutory authority and which implement the statute ... such rules
have the force and effect of law."55
To have the force of law, the rules must be promulgated pursuant to
the procedures stated in § 553 of the APA, unless they concern
matters that are exempted.551 Section 553 rulemaking procedure may
consist of informal notice and comment. That is, Federal Register
notice to the public of a proposed rule, followed by an opportunity for
the public to comment on the proposal. Or, the language of the
agency legislation may "trigger" application of the formal, trial-type
procedures of APA §§ 556 and 557. In that event, the rule must be
promulgated in compliance with those procedures.
Agency legislation also may impose a range of procedures, in
addition to notice and comment, but short of formal trial-type
procedures. After consideration and promulgation by the agency, the
rule must be published in the Federal Register. Later it is codified
into the Code of Federal Regulations.
549. NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251,
257 (1995) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
550. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act 30 n.3 (1947); see Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416,425 n.9 (1977).
551. Proposed rules may be exempt from the § 553 procedures (1) because of their
subject matter, i.e.,
military or foreign affairs function[s] ... matter[s] relating to agency
management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or
contracts... (2) because they are interpretative rules, general statements of
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice; or [(3)] when
the agency for good cause finds.., that notice and public procedure are...
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
5 U.S.C. § 553(a), (b) (2000).
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2. Adjudication
Agencies also may be delegated authority to decide specific cases
arising during their performance of the tasks assigned. Such authority
may be expressly delegated by statutory language so stating, or
implied, for example, by language authorizing the grant, denial,
suspension, or revocation of permits, licenses, or benefits.
Adjudicatory authority also may be delegated implicitly by language
authorizing the agency to regulate the activities of persons and entities
in specified activities.
The APA provides formal, trial-type procedures in §§ 556 and
557,552 for adjudications that are required to be made after
opportunity for an on the record hearing. The APA provides no
procedures for informal adjudications except some peripheral rights in
§ 555.553 Mead recognized agency formal adjudications as justifying
Chevron deference. However, as discussed, Mead does not consider
whether informal adjudications will also be accorded Chevron
deference. Indeed, as indicated, there are problems presented by the
great variety of procedures used in making informal adjudications.
Even so, NationsBank554 and Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.555 are
evidence that the Court has, in fact, given Chevron deference to
informal adjudications.
Such informal adjudicatory actions authorized by Congress in the
APA, if based on delegated authority, also have the force of law.
Final agency actions, which consist of cease and desist orders, are
enforced by courts. Such orders are considered to be legally binding
and also to have the force of law in the judicial review context. An
excellent example is the order of the NLRB in Hearst. It made no
difference that the agency order was not self-enforcing.5 6
3. Congressional Expectation
In Mead, the Court said that delegation of authority to make
decisions having the force of law may be shown by an agency's power
to adjudicate or make rules, or by some other indication of a
comparable congressional intent. 7 It could be apparent from "the
agency's generally conferred authority and other statutory
circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to
speak with the force of law" '558 or "circumstances pointing to implicit
552. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557.
553. Id. § 555.
554. NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251
(1995).
555. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990).
556. But see Merrill & Hickman, supra note 82, at 890-91.
557. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001).
558. Id. at 229.
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congressional delegation." '559
The vagueness of this delegation format is troublesome, as are the
Court's authorities presented to justify it. NationsBank is probably
the most troublesome. How is "congressional expectation" to be
recognized? By what criteria? It is incumbent on the Court to
provide further clarification and guidance for determining when, in
fact, such delegation has occurred. Blumer, Barnhart, and Alaska
Department of Environmental Conservation begin this process, but
they do not clarify, and they are confusing. In those cases the Court
appeared to apply factors that go to the reasonableness of the
agency's interpretation of the statute rather than to the question of
whether Congress delegated force of law interpretive authority to the
agency on the precise question at issue.
4. Delegated Authority Must Be Employed
Finally, in Mead the Court made clear that it is only when the
agency actually employs its delegated authority to make a legal
determination that it will be accorded Chevron deference. Even then,
deference is given only if its interpretation is "reasonable in light of
the legislature's revealed design."5" Failure to exercise delegated
authority to interpret in a format having the force of law leaves the
agency with nothing except its executive power upon which to assert
that its decision warrants Chevron deference. But Christensen, Mead,
and Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation make clear
that such interpretations warrant only Skidmore-Christensen
persuasive deference.
CONCLUSION
This basic model for scope of judicial review of agency legal
determinations is the product of an attempt to synthesize the major
themes that have recurred in U.S. Supreme Court opinions for many
years. Perhaps it will be useful as we move further into a time of
terrorism. The Administrative Procedure Act should not be assumed
to provide adequate procedural protection for persons caught up in
agency administration of the multifarious legislative responses to the
September 11, 2001 attacks. 56'
559. Id. at 237.
560. NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co, 513 U.S. 251, 257
(1995).
561. See Michael Fitzpatrick, Code Orange: Will it Be Used to "End-Run" Federal
Rulemaking Requirements?, 29 Admin. & Reg. L. News 11 (2004).
This legislation includes: the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56); the Public
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act (P.L. 107-
188); the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (P.L. 107-297); the Enhance Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (P.L. 107-173); the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (P.L. 107-295); the Aviation and Transportation
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First, the APA rulemaking procedures do not apply to a "military
or foreign affairs function 5 62 nor to "a matter relating to agency
management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits
or contracts.
5 63
Second, the APA rulemaking procedures do not apply to agency
interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice; or... when the agency for
good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement
of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public
procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
public interest."
Agency rules promulgated pursuant to the good cause exception may
be made effective immediately.
Third, the APA adjudication procedures apply only to formal, on
the record proceedings required by statute565 or the Constitution; and
they do not apply to "the conduct of military or foreign affairs
functions. "566
Fourth, statutes containing specific procedural components that
conflict with the general procedures of the APA "trump" the APA
provisions by reason of the coordinating language in APA § 559.567
Finally, the due process-based, general principle of a right to a
hearing before the government acts to deprive a person of a life,
liberty, or property interest may not be available. That is, agencies
may be vested with authority to act summarily, and in public
emergencies or extraordinary situations act immediately to effect a
deprivation of an interest protected by due process of law. Thus, the
process due in the particular situation will be deferred, although it is
to be provided promptly after the deprivation. What constitutes an
acceptable period of delay will depend on the particular situation.568
Security Act (P.L. 107-71); and the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act
(P.L. 107-188). Perhaps most significantly, the Homeland Security Act (P.L.
107-296) created a vast new Department of Homeland Security charged with
protecting the nation against emerging terrorist threats. Embedded in this
expansive legislation were at least three other formerly free-standing bills-
the Homeland Security Information Sharing Act ("HSIA"), the Critical
Infrastructure Information Act ("CIIA") and the Support Anti-Terrorism
by Fostering Effective Technologies Act ("SAFETY Act").
Id.
562. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2000).
563. Id. § 553(a)(2).
564. Id. § 553(A)(B); Fitzpatrick, supra note 561, at 11; Ellen R. Jordan, The
Administrative Procedure Act's "Good Cause" Exemption, 36 Admin. L. Rev. 113
(1984).
565. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a).
566. Id. § 554(a)(4).
567. 5 U.S.C. § 559.
568. There are a number of illustrations of this U.S. Supreme Court doctrine. See,
e.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997) (summary suspension of a state university
police officer arrested in a drug raid); FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988) (summary
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Therefore, a model for scope of review of agency legal
determinations that synthesizes the precedents and clarifies the
judicial role in various administrative action contexts should be a
useful tool for reviewing courts. Such a model would promote
consistency among the courts. Most importantly, it would aid their
efforts to maintain an acceptable balance between national security
and individual rights in cases involving judicial review of agency
interpretations of their legislation.
removal of bank officials indicted for criminal conduct); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining
and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (summary administrative order to cease
surface mining operations believed harmful to the environment); Barry v. Barchi, 443
U.S. 55 (1979) (summary suspension of a horse trainer's license); Dixon v. Love, 431
U.S. 105 (1977) (summary suspension of drivers' licenses); Ewing v. Mytinger &
Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (summary seizure of technically misbranded
drugs); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (financial exigency requiring summary
removal of bank officials); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S.
306 (1908) (city health officers' summary embargo of warehouse containing poultry
believed to be unsafe for human consumption).
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